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NIS  Network and Information Security 
NIST  US National Institute for Standards and Technology 
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NSCIB  Nederlandse Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging 
OES  Operator of Essential Services 
OvJ  District Attorney (Officier van Justitie) 
PSD2  Payment Services Directive (EU) 2015/2366 
RvA  National Accreditation Body 
SCADA   Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SDO  Standard Development Organisation 
SME  Small Medium Enterprise 
SOG-IS  Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security 
Sw   Sanctiewet 1977 
TSO  Transmission System Operator 
UAVG  Implementing Law of the General Data Protection Regulation 
Wbni  Wet Beveiliging Netwerk- en Informatiesystemen 
Wft   Wet op het financieel toezicht 
Wgmc  Wet Gegevensverwerking en Meldplicht 
Wiv 2017 Wet op de Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten 2017 
Wtt  Wet toezicht trustkantoren 
Wvsr  Wetboek van Strafrecht 
Wwft     Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme 
 
  
Cybersecurity Certification Insights  
 
5 
Table of Contents 
 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................ 3 
Executive summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 
Samenvatting ............................................................................................................................................................... 10 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Background and aims of the Report........................................................................................................................................................ 12 
1.2 Cybersecurity and certification: working definitions ............................................................................................................................ 13 
1.3 Identification of stakeholders.................................................................................................................................................................. 15 
1.3.1 Standardisation Body and National Accreditation Body ........................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.2 Industry vendors and users ......................................................................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.3 Conformity Assessment Bodies ................................................................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.4 Government and Regulators ....................................................................................................................................................... 17 
1.3.5 Civil Rights associations and academia ....................................................................................................................................... 17 
1.4 Methodology and Structure of the Report ............................................................................................................................................. 17 
2 Legal Framework on Cybersecurity in the Netherlands and the mandate of NCSC ......................................... 19 
2.1 An overview of the Dutch Cybersecurity Legislation ........................................................................................................................... 19 
2.1.1 Network and Information Systems Security Act ....................................................................................................................... 19 
2.1.2 The Ministerial Decision on Network and Information Systems Security............................................................................... 20 
2.1.3 The Adaptation law of the Cybersecurity Act ........................................................................................................................... 20 
2.2 Other Relevant Legislation...................................................................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2.1 Dutch Telecommunications Act ................................................................................................................................................. 21 
2.2.2 Cybercrime & the Dutch criminal code ..................................................................................................................................... 21 
2.3 Governance of Dutch cybersecurity protection ..................................................................................................................................... 21 
2.3.1 The legal mandate of the NCSC .................................................................................................................................................. 22 
2.3.2 Other governmental actors in cybersecurity ............................................................................................................................. 24 
Radiocommunications Agency................................................................................................................................................................ 24 
AIVD and MIVD ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 
Digital Trust Centre (EZK) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3 Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) .................................................................................................................... 25 
3 Union legislation on cybersecurity certification ................................................................................................. 26 
3.1 EU Legislation on Cybersecurity ............................................................................................................................................................ 26 
3.1.1 Network and Information Security Directive ............................................................................................................................ 26 
3.1.2 Cybersecurity Act ........................................................................................................................................................................ 26 
3.1.3 A closer look at the Cybersecurity Act Certification Framework ............................................................................................ 27 
A. Essential Components of the certification framework .............................................................................................................. 27 
B. Governance of European cybersecurity certifications ............................................................................................................... 29 
C. The role of national cybersecurity certification authorities...................................................................................................... 30 
3.2 Other relevant legislation ........................................................................................................................................................................ 31 
3.2.1 The Radio Equipment Directive ................................................................................................................................................. 31 
3.2.2 The Regulation on non-personal data flows .............................................................................................................................. 31 
3.2.3 The General Data Protection Regulation ................................................................................................................................... 32 
4 Dutch Cybersecurity Certification Landscape: conformity assessment bodies ................................................. 33 
4.1 Objectives and approach.......................................................................................................................................................................... 33 
4.2 Standardisation ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 33 
4.3 Conformity assessment bodies ................................................................................................................................................................ 33 
4.3.1 Accredited v. non-accredited certification bodies and testing facilities................................................................................... 33 
Cybersecurity Certification Insights  
 
6 
4.3.2 Domestic and supranational activity .......................................................................................................................................... 33 
4.3.3 Outsourcing v. internal resources ............................................................................................................................................... 34 
4.3.4 Other relevant activities .............................................................................................................................................................. 34 
4.3.5 Drivers and obstacles for cybersecurity certification ................................................................................................................ 34 
4.3.6 Relation and role of the NCSC .................................................................................................................................................... 35 
4.4 Public Private Partnerships and certification ........................................................................................................................................ 36 
5 Dutch cybersecurity certification landscape: vendors and users ........................................................................ 37 
5.1 Market overview ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 37 
5.2 Case study I: the energy sector................................................................................................................................................................ 38 
5.2.1 The Dutch energy sector in a nutshell ....................................................................................................................................... 38 
5.2.2 Activities in cybersecurity........................................................................................................................................................... 39 
5.2.3 Drivers, needs, and trends in cybersecurity certification .......................................................................................................... 39 
5.2.4 Relation with and role of NCSC.................................................................................................................................................. 41 
5.3 Case study II: the banking sector ............................................................................................................................................................ 43 
5.3.1 The Dutch banking sector in a nutshell ..................................................................................................................................... 43 
5.3.2 Activities in cybersecurity........................................................................................................................................................... 44 
5.3.3 Drivers, needs, and trends in cybersecurity certification .......................................................................................................... 44 
5.3.4 Relation with and role of the NCSC ........................................................................................................................................... 45 
6 State of the art and new developments in standardisation and certification ..................................................... 46 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 46 
6.2 Standards .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 46 
6.2.1 Formal standards as key component to certification ................................................................................................................. 46 
6.2.2 Non-formal standards and SMEs................................................................................................................................................. 46 
6.3 Cross-sector cybersecurity standardisation and certification................................................................................................................ 46 
6.3.1 ISO/IEC 27001: Information Security Management Systems ................................................................................................... 47 
6.3.2 Common Criteria: Product Certification .................................................................................................................................... 47 
6.3.3 IEC 62443 on Cybersecurity for Industrial Automation and Control Systems ........................................................................ 47 
6.3.4 Other specifications ..................................................................................................................................................................... 48 
6.4 Sector specific initiatives in standardisation and certification .............................................................................................................. 48 
6.4.1 ETSI 303 645: Internet of Things and cybersecurity certification ............................................................................................ 48 
6.4.2 Banking sector and energy .......................................................................................................................................................... 49 
6.4.3 Commission requests to ENISA for preparation of candidate schemes .................................................................................... 49 
6.5 Impact on the Dutch Landscape ............................................................................................................................................................. 50 
6.5.1 Conformity assessment bodies .................................................................................................................................................... 50 
6.5.2 Industry ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 52 
7 Inventory of Potential roles for the NCSC........................................................................................................... 53 
7.1 Introduction, approach and explanation ................................................................................................................................................ 53 
Role 1: Facilitator of knowledge sharing (supportive role) ......................................................................................................................... 54 
Role 2: Awareness raising and training (supportive role) ........................................................................................................................... 56 
Role 3: Provide assistance to the national cybersecurity certification authority in its tasks (supportive/reactive role) ......................... 57 
Role 4: Provide knowledge and expertise during accreditation of certification bodies (reactive role) .................................................... 60 
Role 5: Contribution to development of standards and certifications (reactive role) ............................................................................... 62 
Role 6: Develop own scheme (proactive role).............................................................................................................................................. 63 
8 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................ 66 
Bibliography  ............................................................................................................................................................... 69 
 ANNEX 1: Accredited conformity assessment bodies in the Netherlands (cybersecurity) ................................... 74 
ANNEX 2: Interviewed individuals and organisations ............................................................................................. 77 
ANNEX 3: Interview Guidelines ................................................................................................................................ 79 
 









• The Netherlands is one of the most digitalised countries worldwide. However, digitalisation comes with 
vulnerabilities, as demonstrated with incidents such as the NotPetya case in 2017 and the 2019 
Maastricht University incident. There are several ways to address such cybersecurity issues, standards 
and certifications are one of them. Especially certification as an instrument of regulation is rising after 
the 2019 Union Cybersecurity Act, which introduced a framework for European cybersecurity 
certifications. 
• Against this background, the research aimed at sketching the cybersecurity certification landscape in the 
Netherlands, identify the impact of the Union Cybersecurity Act (CSA) on stakeholders such as industry 
and conformity assessment bodies, and make an inventory of potential roles for the NCSC in this setting. 
• The main instruments of the EU legislation on cybersecurity are the NIS Directive and the CSA, while 
there are more laws which touch upon cybersecurity, including information security, matters such as 
the Radio Equipment Directive. 
• The Dutch legal framework on Cybersecurity is mainly the Network and Information Systems Security 
Act (Wbni), which is the implementation of the NIS Directive, and organisational decrees and 
Ministerial Decisions. The adaptation law of the Union Cybersecurity Act has not been published yet. It 
is expected to designate the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, and its Radiotelecommunications 
Agency, as the national cybersecurity certification authority.  
• The Netherlands follows a decentralised model, whereby several agencies and Ministries have 
competences in cybersecurity. The NCSC in the Netherlands is part of the Ministry of Justice and 
Security and its tasks are mainly stemming from the NIS Directive and its implementing legislation 
(Single Point of Contact, CSIRT, support to Operators of Essential Services, technical analysis and 
research, information dissemination and others). Other actors include the Radiotelecommunications 
Agency, the General Intelligence and Security Service, the National Bureau for Security Connections, 
the Military Intelligence and Security Service, and the Digital Trust Centre. 
• Public Private Partnerships have a substantial role in cybersecurity in the Netherlands. The Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC), which are sectoral network initiatives, developed and operating 
under the lead of the NCSC, are an example. Other examples include: Partnering Trust, the Dutch Secure 
Software Alliance and Zeker-Online.  
• In analysing the conformity assessment part of the Dutch cybersecurity certification landscape, it is 
evident that in the Netherlands there are both national but also many conformity assessment bodies 
operating internationally. These multinational activities influence the positioning of CABs, which do 
not follow only local developments and have an interest to strengthen their governmental relations not 
only within the Netherlands, but also cross-border. According to interviewed CABs, trust, reliability, 
reputation with partners and consumers, and first-movers advantage are drivers for cybersecurity 
certification. The most important driver is legislation and certification being mandatory. Costs are 
reported as obstacles, and for this reason some CABs offer alternatives such as assessment based on non-
formal standards. 
• The research on the views of the industry (energy and banking sector) showed that while companies are 
interested/ or sometimes obliged to conform to cybersecurity standards, they are not always motivated 
to pursue certification. Stringent documentation requirements and high costs are obstacles for 
certification. Mandatory certification is deemed desirable by some energy OES in the Netherlands, while 
this is not the case in the banking sector, as the multitude of standards and specifications already imposed 
on the sector requires extensive resources for compliance. Improvement of internal security, trust with 
consumers, demonstrating compliance with legal obligations to the regulator, and cross-border 
cooperation are some of the drivers for certification, while awareness for its added value is viewed as 
necessary. 
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• When it comes to state of the art and new developments in standardisation and certification, the research 
showed that formal standards are a preferred option for certification. Cross-sector standards such as the 
ISO/IEC 27001, the Common Criteria, the IEC 62443 for Industrial Automation and Control Systems are 
preferred solutions. Further, cryptography standards, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and some 
informal standards are used as reference documents. Several sector specific standards are also used, such 
as the ETSI 303 645 on IoT. 
• With regard to the (expected) impact of the CSA on the Dutch cybersecurity certification stakeholders, 
some CABs reported new business opportunities and re-arrangement of the market, while some others 
showed hesitation and doubts about the market demand. The energy and banking sectors, view the CSA 
as stimulating the market, but do not expect a direct impact, since certifications are (still) voluntary. 
However, European certifications in relevant areas, such as IoT and cloud, are expected to have an 
indirect impact on energy companies and banks. 
• Last, an inventory of potential roles for the NCSC was drafted, based on the analysis of the Dutch legal 
framework, the opportunities created by the CSA, and the needs, drivers, obstacles reported by the Dutch 
cybersecurity certification stakeholders. Those options were explored as a thought provoking exercise 
for further outlook and discussion, and do not delve into matters of internal capacity and resources or 
feasibility in view of the relations with other governmental agencies.  
• Those potential roles range from supportive, reactive to proactive ones. Facilitating knowledge sharing 
on cybersecurity certifications via national ISACs, or other informal collaborations, raising awareness 
and conducting trainings, expanding voluntary collaborations with certification bodies and other 
stakeholders are in general roles within the current mandate of the NCSC, with strong supportive role. 
The NCSC could also explore the option of providing substantial assistance to the national cybersecurity 
certification authority in providing advice during the assessments of high assurance certifications, or 
providing aggregated data on deficiencies in the implementation of schemes. Alternatively, the NCSC 
could lend its expertise to the National Accreditation Body when conducting assessments of certification 
bodies. Further, continuing and systematizing the current work of the NCSC in standardisation, could 
be valued by its partners, as promoting their interests at national, European, and international fora. Last, 
following the example of the National Cyber Security Centers of other countries, the NCSC-NL could 
develop its own national scheme and label, in areas not covered by the European cybersecurity 
certifications.  
• All those options, bring forward two main elements of the NCSC: the trusted partnerships and deep 
expert knowledge in the field. The study showed that there are issues to be considered when adopting 
those options such as expanding its legal mandate. On top of any future role of the NCSC in the 
certification landscape in the Netherlands, the NCSC should keep an eye for other forthcoming related 
developments, which may strengthen its mandate, such as the ongoing revision of the NIS Directive. 
 
  




• Nederland is een van de meest gedigitaliseerde landen ter wereld. Digitalisering gaat echter gepaard met 
kwetsbaarheden, zoals de NotPetya-zaak in 2017 en het incident van de Universiteit Maastricht in 2019. 
Er zijn verschillende manieren om dergelijke cyberbeveiligingsproblemen aan te pakken. Bijvoorbeeld 
met het gebruik van normen en certificeringen. Vooral het gebruik van certificering als 
reguleringsinstrument neemt toe na de Union Cybersecurity Act 2019 waarmee een regelgevend kader 
wordt geïntroduceerd voor Europese cyberbeveiligingscertificeringen. 
• Tegen deze achtergrond is het onderzoek gericht op het schetsen van het landschap van 
cyberbeveiligingscertificering in Nederland, het identificeren van de impact van de Union Cybersecurity 
Act (CSA) op belanghebbenden zoals de industrie en conformiteitsbeoordelingsinstanties, en het 
inventariseren van mogelijke rollen voor het NCSC binnen dit landschap. 
• De belangrijkste instrumenten van de EU-wetgeving inzake cyberbeveiliging zijn de NIS-richtlijn en de 
CSA, maar er zijn ook andere wetten die betrekking hebben op cyberbeveiliging en 
informatiebeveiliging, zoals de radioapparatuur richtlijn. 
• Het Nederlandse rechtskader voor cyberveiligheid bestaat voornamelijk uit de wet op de beveiliging van 
netwerk- en informatiesystemen (Wbni), organisatorische besluiten en ministeriële besluiten. De 
aanpassingswet van de Union Cybersecurity Act is nog niet gepubliceerd. Het wordt verwacht dat in de 
aanpassingswet het Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, en het daaronder vallende Bureau 
voor Radiotelecommunicatie, wordt aangewezen als de nationale certificeringsinstantie voor 
cyberbeveiliging. 
• Nederland volgt een gedecentraliseerd model, waarbij verschillende instanties en ministeries 
bevoegdheden hebben op het gebied van cybersecurity. Het NCSC in Nederland maakt deel uit van het 
ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid en haar taken vloeien voornamelijk voort uit de NIS-richtlijn en de 
Wbni (Single Point of Contact, CSIRT, ondersteuning aan exploitanten van essentiële diensten, 
technische analyse en onderzoek, informatieverspreiding) en anderen). Andere actoren zijn onder meer 
Agentschap Telecom, de Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, het Nationaal Bureau voor 
Verbindingsbeveiliging, de Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst en het Digital Trust Center. 
• Publiek-private samenwerking speelt een substantiële rol in het Nederlandse landschap inzake 
cybersecuritycertificering. Een voorbeeld hiervan zijn de informatie-uitwisselings- en analysecentra 
(ISAC). Dit zijn sectorale netwerkinitiatieven die functioneren en ontwikkeld worden onder leiding van 
het NCSC. Andere voorbeelden zijn: Partnering Trust, de Dutch Secure Software Alliance en Zeker-
Online. 
• Bij het analyseren van het conformiteitsbeoordelingsgedeelte van het Nederlandse 
cyberbeveiligingscertificatielandschap is het duidelijk dat er in Nederland 
conformiteitsbeoordelingsinstanties zijn die zowel nationaal en internationaal actief zijn. Deze 
multinationale activiteiten beïnvloeden de positionering van CBI’s aangezien zijn niet alleen lokale 
ontwikkelingen volgen maar er ook belang bij hebben hun bestuurlijke relaties op grensoverschrijdend 
vlak te versterken. Volgens geïnterviewde CIB's zijn vertrouwen, betrouwbaarheid, reputatie bij 
partners en consumenten, en het first-moversvoordeel drijfveren voor cyberbeveiligingscertificering. De 
belangrijkste drijfveren zijn echter wetgeving en het verplicht stellen van certificering. De kosten die 
gepaard gaan met certificering worden gerapporteerd als een obstakel en daarom bieden sommige CBI's 
alternatieven aan, zoals beoordeling op basis van niet-formele normen. 
• Uit het onderzoek naar de opvattingen van de industrie (energie- en banksector) bleek dat bedrijven 
weliswaar geïnteresseerd en soms verplicht zijn om te voldoen aan cyberbeveiligingsnormen, maar niet 
altijd gemotiveerd zijn om certificering na te streven. Strenge documentatievereisten en hoge kosten zijn 
belemmeringen voor certificering. Verplichte certificering wordt door sommige energie-OES in 
Nederland wenselijk geacht, terwijl dit in de banksector niet het geval is vanwege het veelvoud aan 
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normen en specificaties die al aan de sector zijn opgelegd en de daaraan verbonden nalevingskosten. 
Verbetering van de interne veiligheid, vertrouwen bij de consument, het aantonen van compliance aan 
de wetgever en grensoverschrijdende samenwerking zijn enkele drijfveren voor certificering. Bewustzijn 
voor de toegevoegde waarde van certificering wordt tevens noodzakelijk geacht. 
• Als het gaat om state-of-the-art en nieuwe ontwikkelingen op het gebied van standaardisatie en 
certificering, toonde het onderzoek aan dat formele standaarden een voorkeursoptie zijn voor 
certificering. Sectoroverschrijdende standaarden zoals de ISO/ IEC 27001, de Common Criteria, de IEC 
62443 voor industriële automatisering en controlesystemen zijn voorkeursoplossingen. Verder worden 
cryptografische standaarden, het NIST Cybersecurity Framework en enkele informele standaarden 
gebruikt als referentiedocumenten. Er worden ook verschillende sectorspecifieke normen gebruikt, zoals 
de ETSI 303 645 voor IoT. 
• Met betrekking tot de (verwachte) impact van de CSA voor Nederlandse stakeholders, meldden sommige 
CBI's nieuwe zakelijke kansen en een nieuwe marktordening, terwijl anderen hun twijfels hadden bij de 
marktvraag voor certificering. De energie- en banksector zien de CSA als stimulerend voor de markt, 
maar verwachten geen directe impact, aangezien certificeringen (nog) vrijwillig zijn. Europese 
certificeringen op relevante gebieden, zoals IoT en cloud, zullen naar verwachting een indirecte impact 
hebben op energiebedrijven en banken. 
• Ten slotte is een inventarisatie gemaakt van mogelijke rollen voor het NCSC op basis van de analyse van 
het Nederlandse wettelijke kader, de kansen die de CSA heeft gecreëerd en de behoeften, drijfveren, 
belemmeringen die door de Nederlandse cybersecurity-certificeringsactoren zijn gemeld. Deze 
inventarisatie is gemaakt als een tot nadenken stemmende oefening voor verder vooruitzicht en 
discussie, en gaan niet in op kwesties van interne capaciteit en middelen of haalbaarheid in het licht van 
de relaties met andere overheidsinstanties. 
• De potentiële rollen variëren van ondersteunend, reactief tot proactief. Het faciliteren van het delen van 
kennis over cyberbeveiligingscertificeringen via nationale ISAC's of andere informele samenwerkingen, 
het vergroten van het bewustzijn en het geven van trainingen, het uitbreiden van vrijwillige 
samenwerkingen met certificeringsinstanties en andere stakeholders vallen in het algemeen binnen het 
huidige mandaat van de NCSC waarbij de nadruk ligt op een ondersteunende rol. Het NCSC zou ook de 
mogelijkheid kunnen onderzoeken om de nationale cyberbeveiligingscertificeringsautoriteit 
aanzienlijke bijstand te verlenen door advies te verstrekken bij de beoordeling van ‘high assurance’ 
certificeringen, of om geaggregeerde gegevens te verstrekken over tekortkomingen bij de uitvoering van 
regelingen. Als alternatief zou het NCSC zijn expertise kunnen uitlenen aan de nationale accreditatie-
instantie bij het uitvoeren van beoordelingen van certificatie-instellingen. Verder zou de voortzetting 
en systematisering van het huidige werk van de NCSC op het gebied van standaardisatie door haar 
partners kunnen worden gewaardeerd aangezien NCSC hun belangen zou kunnen behartigen op 
nationale, Europese en internationale fora. Ten slotte zou NCSC-NL, naar het voorbeeld van de nationale 
cyberbeveiligingscentra van andere landen, een eigen nationaal schema en label kunnen ontwikkelen op 
gebieden die niet onder de Europese cyberbeveiligingscertificeringen vallen. 
• Al deze opties brengen twee hoofdelementen van het NCSC naar voren: de vertrouwde partnerschappen 
en diepgaande vakkennis in het veld. Uit de studie bleek dat er bij de vaststelling van de verscheidene 
opties rekening moet worden gehouden met een mogelijke uitbreiding van het wettelijke mandaat. Naast 
elke toekomstige rol van de NCSC in het certificeringslandschap in Nederland, moet het NCSC ook oog 
hebben voor andere aanstaande gerelateerde ontwikkelingen, die haar mandaat kunnen versterken, zoals 
de voortdurende herziening van de NIS-richtlijn. 
  
  




1.1 Background and aims of the Report 
The Netherlands is one of the most digitalised countries worldwide.1 However, digitalisation comes with 
vulnerabilities, as demonstrated with incidents such as the NotPetya case in 20172 and the increasing supply chain 
compromise in software and through cloud objects.3 Despite the investments in cybersecurity, there are new 
vulnerabilities and new targets, such as educational institutions,4 and new threats which render cybersecurity 
and the assessment of the level of a company’s cybersecurity an ongoing concern for organisations. Cyberattacks 
or compromises in the overall security of products or systems may have potential adverse impacts on 
governmental functionalities, businesses, individual users, the society at large and national security. A recent 
example is a data breach in the “RIVM infection radar” which may have resulted in disclosure of sensitive health 
information, who participated in the Infection Radar.5  
Research and practice have shown that standardisation and conformity assessment are valuable tools in enhancing 
cybersecurity, and addressing issues unlikely to be resolved by a single company or organisation. Standards codify 
and accumulate the knowledge and best practices of significant players in the cybersecurity field. Accordingly, 
certification by accredited conformity assessment bodies offers the potential of an independent audit by a third 
party (the CAB) and the reliable attestation for the level of security of an organisation’s processes, products, 
systems, or services.  
There is a variety of standards development organisations (SDOs) working on cybersecurity standards. Formal 
standardisation bodies, such as the NEN in the Netherlands, CEN, CENELEC and ETSI at EU level, and ISO, IEC, 
and ITU at international level, are working in parallel to a variety of informal organisations and industry fora and 
consortia such as OASIS, OWASP, W3C, IETF and others.6 Standards and certification schemes based on those 
standards are developed for different aspects of the security lifecycle of “Assess - Design – Manage – Monitor - 
Deploy", such as:7 
• Security feature provision 
• Security assurance 
• Security threat sharing 
• Organisational management for secure operations. 
In addition, standards in the broader cybersecurity field are often classified as ICT related security standards, 
cybersecurity standards, risk management standards (such as the NIST Special Publication 800-30 providing 
guidance for conducting risk assessments) and others.8 
At the same time, certification as an instrument of regulation is rising. In 2019, the Cybersecurity Act introduced 
a framework for European cybersecurity certifications. The European Cybersecurity Certification Framework is 
expected to provide a baseline mechanism for further development of cybersecurity certification schemes at EU 
level with the aim to attest that ICT products, ICT services, ICT processes “comply with specified security 
requirements for the purpose of protecting the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or 
transmitted or processed data or the functions or services offered by, or accessible via, those products, services 
and processes throughout their life cycle." The Cybersecurity Act adopts a centralised model, whereby the 
European Commission and ENISA play a pivotal role in developing and adopting cybersecurity certification 
schemes, leading to a more harmonised landscape. In the implementation phase, national actors in the Member 
Cybersecurity Certification Insights  
 
13 
States take over the assessments, granting of certifications, and being responsible for supervision. National 
authorities of the Member States need to re-assess how they position themselves in the new landscape and 
identify areas to improve and update their role both at national and EU level. 
Following these developments, the Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) identified a strategic need for an 
insight in the Dutch certification landscape, the upcoming changes due to the EU developments, as well as an 
exploration of the potential (supporting) roles of the NCSC. Against this background, the research aimed at 
sketching the cybersecurity certification landscape in the Netherlands, identify the impact of the Union 
Cybersecurity Act so far on stakeholders such as the industry and conformity assessment bodies, and make an 
inventory of potential roles for the NCSC in this setting. 
1.2 Cybersecurity and certification: working definitions 
Cybersecurity is a broad concept, for which multiple definitions exist. The US National Institute for Standards 
and Technology (NIST) defines cybersecurity as “prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of 
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and 
electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.”9 Other definitions focus on the type of activities to be 
undertaken by an organisation,10 or the goal of protection of systems, or of property rights.11 
As the High Level Group of Scientific Advisors of the European Commission has explained, cybersecurity as an 
academic field of study combines a multiplicity of disciplines, ranging from technical to cultural behavior.12 
Indeed, a grammatical or hermeneutical approach in defining cybersecurity might lead to different results on 
how the term is used in practice and legislation.13  
Focusing on the Union legislation, the recently adopted EU Cybersecurity Act defines cybersecurity as: 
 “the activities necessary to protect network and information systems, the users of 
such systems, and other persons affected by cyber-threats.”14  
The definition includes two types of targets that are deemed to need protection: systems and persons. Network 
and information systems, according to the NIS Directive include an electronic communications network, 15 any 
device or interconnected or related devices, “one or more of which, pursuant to a program, perform automatic 
processing of digital data”, or “digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted” for the purposes of their 
“operation, use, protection and maintenance”.  
The protection of a network and information security system16 relates to the ability of network and information 
systems to resist actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data.17 At 
the same time, cybersecurity does not deal only with technology, but also with human behavior.18 Cyberthreats 
are directed and affect anything that can damage, disrupt or otherwise adversely impact network and information 
systems, the users of such systems and other persons. The CSA definition includes also another category of 
individuals: those that while are not using the given system, are nonetheless affected by cyberthreats. This 
category expands the scope of cybersecurity significantly, as anyone can potentially be affected by cyberthreats. 
Thus, individuals are part of the problem, as potential threats, but also a protected group, as targets. Important 
for an understanding of the scope of cybersecurity is to note that, according to ENISA, network and information 
security are subsets of cybersecurity.19 In this study, we adopt the cybersecurity definition as provided in the EU 
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Cybersecurity Act, since the scope of the study relates closely to the developments and impact of the EU CSA in 
the Netherlands. 
Related to the broad scope of what falls under the definition of cybersecurity is the issue of which aspects, 
domains, and sectors pertain to cybersecurity. The taxonomy by the Joint Research Centre is the starting point 
and guiding document for our research.20 The holistic taxonomy is constituted by three dimensions: 
 
Figure 1: JRC High-level holistic cybersecurity taxonomy 
• Cybersecurity domains, which represent areas of knowledge in relation to different aspects of cybersecurity. 
• Sectorial Dimensions, which help contextualise cybersecurity, requirements and challenges in different sectors 
e.g. energy. 
• Technologies and use case dimensions, which represent technological aspects of the cybersecurity domains. 
The JRC taxonomy gives an overview of the landscape and the different dimensions of cybersecurity. For the 
selection of relevant sectors at large for the study, we navigated through the JRC taxonomy with the priority 
sectors of the Network and Information Security Directive as drivers.21 Those sectors and subsectors for the two 
types of regulated entities (Operators of Essential Services and Digital Service Providers) are:22 
OES Sectors NIS Directive Subsector 
Energy Electricity, oil, gas. 
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Transport Air transport, rail transport, water transport, road transport. 
Banking N/A 
Financial market and infrastructures N/A 
Health sector Healthcare settings 
Drinking water supply and distribution N/A 
Digital Infrastructure  
Digital Service Providers NIS Directive 
Online marketplace 
Online search engine 
Cloud computing service 
Table 1: NIS Directive regulated sectors 
The scope of the research of this study required focusing mainly on the dimension of sectors, as a means to provide 
insights for cross-sector use, and the research domain (certification). The research kept an open eye for the third 
dimension of the taxonomy (technology). 
When it comes to defining certification, there are several well-accepted definitions. The ISO/IEC 17000 standard 
providing definitions of conformity assessment terms, defines certification as: “third-party attestation, related to 
an object of conformity assessment,” that is an object such as product, service, system, data, design, body etc., to 
which specified requirements apply. 23 Significant element of the definition is that a third party is conducting the 
assessment and grants the certification. This provides guarantees of an independent assessment, and essentially 
makes certification a trust mechanism. Further, when the conformity assessment body – certification body, lab, 
inspection body – is itself going through an assessment of its independence, integrity, capacity and competence, 
we speak of accreditation. Certification is conducted on the basis of a certification scheme, which as the Union 
Cybersecurity Act provides, it is a “comprehensive set of rules, technical requirements, standards, and 
procedures”.24 
1.3 Identification of stakeholders 
The consultation of stakeholders is essential to help define the role of NCSC in cybersecurity certification. 
Cybersecurity (certification) likely plays a different role for different stakeholders and if NCSC is to advise 
stakeholders it is important to understand their take on cybersecurity (certification). This section describes how 
we made a selection of the types of organisations that are considered as ‘stakeholders’ for the project. Being a 
stakeholder means that the views/needs or practices of a given type of organisation are important to be collected 
and considered in order to reach a set of Recommendations. 
The stakeholder identification was based on the analysis of the relevant legislation such as the Cybersecurity Act, 
the NIS Directive, the Wbni, the developments at EU level on cybersecurity certification (e.g. ad hoc working 
groups), and existing studies. We focused on the national dimension, but keeping an eye on EU developments 
that may shape cybersecurity policy further down the line.  
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For gathering the input of the stakeholders, the approach was to be inclusive, instead of prima facie selectiveness, 
taking into account however practical constraints of the project such as time, budget, and availability or interest 
of the stakeholders. The outcome of the above exercise is the list of stakeholder groups outlined in this section of 
the Report. It should be noted that the goal of the exercise is not representation of any possible group, but a 
sufficient coverage of needs and interests, and expertise or knowledge on the research questions of the project. 
1.3.1 Standardisation Body and National Accreditation Body 
The Dutch Standardisation Organisation (NEN) is active in developing national standards in the field of 
information security and cybersecurity. Standardisation experts in the ICT standardisation cluster at NEN are 
relevant for the project as they stir and impact the certification landscape to a certain extent. In addition, NEN 
also participates in the European Standardisation Organisations’ Technical Committees active in the field such as 
the Joint Technical Committee CEN/CLC/JTC 13 Cybersecurity and Data Protection, as well as the international 
standardisation organisations, such as ISO and IEC.25  
The National Accreditation Council (Raad voor Accreditatie) plays quite an important role in the landscape, 
especially since the Cybersecurity Act establishes mandatory accreditation for certification bodies that intend to 
offer services on the European cybersecurity certification schemes. The National Accreditation Body will provide 
accreditation in line with the CSA schemes. 
Beyond the formal standardisation organisations recognized by Union legislation, there are initiatives and 
platforms in the field of standardisation. One example is the Standardisation Forum (Forum Standaardisatie), 
which aims to promote interoperability and supplier independence through the use of open standards for digital 
data exchange in the public sector. The Forum consists of experts from various government organizations, 
business and science.26 Part of the thematic portfolio of the Standardisation Forum concerns the Internet and 
security related standards.27 Another example is the Platform for Internet Standards (Platform 
Internetstandaarden), which promotes specifications for safe digital processes and infrastructure in a number of 
domains such as health, privacy, Artificial Intelligence, and Internet Governance.28  
1.3.2 Industry vendors and users 
The consultation of industry is essential to identify what are the future topics and domains of certification that 
the industry in the Netherlands would expect developments, and how the NCSC could play a role in supporting 
those needs and developments. Priority and the main focus is on the industry stakeholders established in the 
Netherlands, including producers, service providers, (vendors) and users, procurers. To some limited extent, 
representatives of industry at EU level are also considered stakeholders for this study. An example is the European 
Cybersecurity Organisation (ECSO), which is the European Commission’s counterpart on contractual Public-
Private Partnerships (cPPPs). 29 
1.3.3 Conformity Assessment Bodies 
Another stakeholder group is that of the conformity assessment bodies conducting tests and performing 
evaluations for cybersecurity certification in the Netherlands. The research focuses on accredited certification 
bodies, due to the high quality guarantees those bodies offer, as prescribed by the relevant EU legislation.30 
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1.3.4 Government and Regulators 
The cybersecurity regulatory landscape in the Netherlands is complex, as outlined in Chapter 2. The CSA and the 
introduction of new powers for authorities on cybersecurity certification, and the goals of the study require that 
those governmental actors competent in the field of cybersecurity are consulted. 
1.3.5 Civil Rights associations and academia 
While not directly involved in cybersecurity certification, this group of stakeholders shows the impact of the lack 
of cybersecurity certification or of a bad quality certification, to the individual due to the potential or concluded 
cyberattacks. 
1.4 Methodology and Structure of the Report 
The research for this Report followed a mix of methods, which include doctrinal legal analysis (Chapters 2 and 
3), literature review and analysis of policy and technical documentation (standards and certification schemes) 
(Chapters 2-7), stakeholder analysis (Chapters 4-7) and semi-structured interviews with experts (Chapters 4-7). 
The combination of methods offered a balanced approach in addressing the project aims. The literature review 
provided first insights on cybersecurity certifications in the Netherlands, alongside conformity assessment bodies, 
such as certification bodies and laboratories. Further, the analysis of the legal framework in which the NCSC 
operates, but also of the new EU legal framework affecting the national landscape set an essential basis for the 
further research of the project. The stakeholder identification and analysis, together with semi-structured 
interviews with selected experts, informed and refined the initial findings and contributed to comprehensive 
outlook for potential roles.  
With regard to the empirical research of this project, the research team interviewed 26 experts in May and June 
2020. The aim of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain information related to the main goals of the study 
as stated above, and to test the findings from the literature review and the legal analysis. The selection criteria 
for the conformity assessment bodies included establishment of HQ or operational office in the Netherlands, 
experience in the field of cybersecurity certification, accreditation from the Dutch Accreditation Council (Raad 
voor Accreditatie), which is a formal requirement imposed by the EU Cybersecurity Act. Interview requests have 
also been sent to a limited number of companies from the energy sector and the finance sector, in coordination 
with the NCSC. The expert selection of the governmental contacts was facilitated by the NCSC. The interviews 
were conducted via videoconferencing, in Dutch and in English. The findings were validated and enriched in a 
feedback workshop with invited experts from the National Cyber Security Centre. 
Regarding the scope and limitations of the research: The Report aims at bringing insights that can be applied 
cross-sector. The EU Cybersecurity Act, which triggered the interest for this Report, is not a sectorial law and 
hence exploring different sectors may bring different insights in the needs of the various stakeholders. This 
approach is justified also from standardisation in the field and certification, which adopt a cross-sector approach 
when it comes to baseline requirements, and often relate to sectors for fine-tuning the requirements or adding 
layers on top of the basic requirements. This is why in the stakeholder identification, we are interested in 
regulators, standardisation and certification actors with an expertise in cybersecurity (certification), not focusing 
on specific sectors. Nonetheless, there are two issues which demand a different approach when it comes to 
industry (vendors and consumers/users) stakeholders. One is that inevitably, due to the limited mandate for this 
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project, a full scale empirical research covering all the different relevant sectors was impossible due to resource 
limitations. Second, the mandate of the NCSC plays an important role. If our aim is to provide useful 
recommendations for potential (advisory) roles of the NCSC in the field of cybersecurity certification in the 
Netherlands, the entities connected from a regulatory perspective to the NCSC (Partners en doelgroepen) should 
be the main focus of the research. Since the NCSC is the Single Contact Point and the Computer Security Incident 
Response Team (CSIRT) in line with the Network and Information Security Directive (NIS) and its national 
implementation in the Netherlands (Wbni), the Operators of Essential Services and the Digital Service Providers 
were the possible candidates. From the OES (vitale aanbieders) of Annex II NIS Directive, namely 1. Energy 2. 
Transport 3. Banking 4. Financial market infrastructures 5. Health sector 6. Drinking water supply and 
distribution 7. Digital Infrastructure, two sectors were selected, Energy and Banking. The criteria for the selection 
include the maturity of cybersecurity standardisation and certification in each sector, the cybersecurity capacity 
of the sector, the potential societal impact in terms of compromise of cybersecurity,31 the critical value and effect 
in cybersecurity. At European level, finance (EU FI-ISAC) and energy (EE-ISAC) were the first two EU 
Information Sharing and Analysis centres to be established, which illustrates the strong cross-border 
collaboration aspect in these two sectors. In addition, both sectors were confirmed as interesting case studies after 
the test interview with the Dutch Standardisation Institute NEN. 
In addition, the focus is ICT products/systems and services, in line with the scope of the CSA. Certification of 
persons and skills is therefore excluded from the study. The report provides a set of policy recommendations to 
the NCSC, which does not include however an assessment of the potential impact of different roles for the 
organisation in terms of resources, efficiency, impact on society. Another limitation relates to the ongoing 
developments at EU level regarding the European Cybersecurity Framework and a ´moving target´ approach. 
The collection of data for the research ended in June 2020. As mentioned above, the research is limited to 
accredited conformity assessment bodies, as accreditation is a formal legal requirement in the EU Cybersecurity 
Act. Finally, the accessibility of information and experts for interviews was hindered, but not impacted by the 
ongoing conditions during the COVID19 pandemic. 
The Report is structured as follows. First the legal frameworks on cybersecurity in the Netherlands and the 
European Union are presented and analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. Next, Chapters 4-6 depict the cybersecurity 
certification in the Netherlands, following the EU Cybersecurity Act. Chapter 4 focuses on conformity 
assessment, and Chapter 6 on the industry (vendors and users/consumers). Next, following the analysis in the 
previous Chapters, Chapter 7 positions the NCSC in the cybersecurity certification landscape and discusses 
options for possible roles for the agency. Chapter 8 concludes the Report. 
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2 Legal Framework on Cybersecurity in the Netherlands and the mandate of NCSC 
2.1 An overview of the Dutch Cybersecurity Legislation 
The Netherlands is a frontrunner in societal digitization, using digital infrastructure for the communication 
between citizens and the government, to provide healthcare and education and to increase flexibility and mobility 
in the workplace.32 Although this digitization is a driver of economic growth and societal welfare, it is also paired 
with risks for privacy and data security, cybercrime and the disruption of societal processes through cyberattacks. 
The government must ensure that there is a high level of protection against cyberthreats and incidents. To 
strengthen the resilience of the Dutch digital society, the Dutch government has decided to strengthen the legal 
position of the NCSC in their coalition agreement.33 Following this decision, the NCSC has been separated from 
its parent organisation – the National Coordinator for Terrorism and Security (NCTV), to become a standalone 
organisation. Close ties between the two organisations continue to exist, since a high level of cooperation between 
these organisations is important to protect the Dutch society from on- and offline threats.34  
Due to the many aspects of digital security, the Dutch cybersecurity landscape is complex and fragmented, 
involving many players that focus on different aspects of digital resilience. The tasks and responsibilities 
concerning cybersecurity are arranged through several laws and policies. Moreover, the Netherlands relies on 
cooperation between private and public parties.35 Besides national legislation, there is a growing body of European 
legislation in this area, and the Netherlands must ensure compliance of its cybersecurity arrangements with the 
EU law. In 2018, the Network and Information Systems Security Act (Wbni)36 was introduced to implement the 
European NIS Directive in Dutch law. The Wbni replaced the Data Processing and Notification Requirement Act 
(Wgmc)37 and led to a reorganisation of the Dutch cybersecurity response network. With the upcoming national 
implementation of the European Cybersecurity Act, the existing division of tasks and roles of existing 
organisations are due to change again, introducing new tasks and obligations on Dutch public bodies concerning 
cybersecurity. What follows is a brief overview of the Dutch cybersecurity landscape of the prevailing regulation. 
2.1.1 Network and Information Systems Security Act  
The Wbni functions with the specific purpose of strengthening the resilience of Dutch cybersecurity. The Wbni 
is specifically aimed at the prevention of cyber-crises and incidents and promoting the operational information 
exchange concerning these threats and incidents between relevant national and international entities.38 The 
Wbni codifies and allocates the competences, rights and obligations of the CSIRT and sectoral CSIRTs concerning 
the notification of- and coordinating responses to- cyber threats and incidents. When a cybersecurity incident 
occurs at an essential service provider, they have an obligation to notify the NCSC as the central contact point.39 
Digital service providers have to notify the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate (Telecommunications 
Agency)40 via their CSIRT-DSP.41 Sector specific authorities are also appointed in the Wbni: The Dutch Central 
Bank (DNB) is appointed as the responsible authority for cybersecurity in the banking- and finance sector; The 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Waterworks is the competent authority for cybersecurity in the Transport and 
water distribution sector and the Ministry of Health is responsible for cybersecurity in the healthcare sector. 
Besides this, the Wbni lays down that any service provider, no matter whether they are essential or fall under a 
different competent authority, can voluntarily notify the NCSC if they suspect a cybersecurity threat.42 
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Besides this, the Wbni lays down several obligations on the private parties in relevant sectors. Operators of 
essential, vital and digital services have an obligation to minimize risks by ensuring that cybersecurity technology 
remains up to date and to take precautions that ensure the continuity of the service in case of cyber incidents. 43 
The Wbni provides a general competence for the introduction of general administrative measures44 that impose 
further obligations on these service providers to take precautions to minimize the risk of cybersecurity incidents.45 
The Wbni also determines when and how service providers are to notify cybersecurity threats and incidents, 
detailing the criteria for establishing a cybersecurity threat and what information must be included in the 
notification.46 
The Wbni also determines how any processing of data, including personal data, should happen in case of a 
cybersecurity threat or incident. CSIRTS (or alternative computer crisis teams) and intelligence- and security 
services are parties that must be informed.47 The Wbni lays down in which situation the public should be 
informed, stating that this may happen either by the Ministry of Justice or by the service providers themselves. 
According to the Wbni, the competent authority may decide that if a cyber-incident occurred at a vital or digital 
service provider, it is necessary to inform the public.48 In addition, in relation to supervision, officers tasked with 
supervision must be appointed by Ministerial decision and these appointments have to be published in the Official 
Dutch Law Gazette.49 The Wbni provides the sector specific competent authorities (aside from the Ministry of 
Justice) with the powers to conduct security audits, give binding instructions, and in case of non-compliance 
impose sanctions in the form of fines or forced restoration of the rightful situation.50 
2.1.2 The Ministerial Decision on Network and Information Systems Security  
Implementing the Wbni, the Dutch government has also introduced the Ministerial Decision on Network and 
Information Systems Security (Bbni)51, further clarifying and detailing the Wbni. For instance, the Bbni 
establishes which service providers are vital service providers or provide essential services in the Netherlands.52 
Furthermore, the Bbni clarifies how notification of cyber incidents should take place and establishes an 
exemption for financial institutes with regard to precautionary measures mandated by the Wbni.53  
2.1.3 The Adaptation law of the Cybersecurity Act 
The Cybersecurity Act, being a Regulation, is binding without transposition into the Dutch legal order. An 
adaptation law is however in the making to facilitate the execution of the Regulation by setting rules on 
procedures, enforcement, the provision of legal protection and to give instructions to executive authorities in the 
Netherlands. The CSA adaptation law (Uitvoeringswet Cyberbeveiligingsverordening) is still a draft bill. The law 
is expected to appoint the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy as the national cybersecurity 
certification authority, and to delegate this role to the Radiocommunications Agency Netherlands.54 It will also 
appoint the Accreditation Council55 as national accreditation body, which will have the right to accredit 
conformity assessment bodies. 
The CSA adaptation Law will set the rules and procedures on distributing certifications with the assurance levels 
‘basic, substantial or high’ in accordance with the Cybersecurity Act. The law will provide the 
Radiocommunications Agency Netherlands with additional competences regarding the assessment of 
certifications with a high assurance level by instating the Decision of approval model’56 Moreover, the law will 
set out additional optional criteria for a request assessment for cybersecurity certification, supplementing the 
mandatory requirements set out in the Cybersecurity Act.57 Furthermore, it will arrange domestic procedures for 
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legal protection that are in line with the General Administrative Act (Awb).58 Finally, the law will assign 
competence to the court of Rotterdam and the College for appeal for businesses59, a specialised judiciary tribunal 
in disputes regarding the approval or denial of cybersecurity certification requests. 
2.2 Other Relevant Legislation 
2.2.1 Dutch Telecommunications Act 
The Dutch Telecommunications Act (Telecommunicatiewet) imposes obligations on providers of telephone- and 
internet access services concerning the creation, operation and commercialisation of communication networks. 
Besides more operational and consumer-oriented obligations, the Telecommunicatiewet also contains several 
provisions on the protection of data and privacy and the continuity of services.60 Especially chapter 11a imposes 
some obligations that demonstrate overlap with the obligations imposed on them under the Wbni. They need to 
minimize the risk of threats to their safety and security, ensure continuity and notify the competent authority of 
any cyberthreats or incidents. Interestingly, the providers of internet access are considered vital service providers 
under the Wbni, placing them under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. In the Telecommunicatiewet 
however, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate is the responsible Ministry. As such, there are overlapping 
obligations on the providers of internet access services. The Nationale Cybersecurity Agenda (NCSA) clarifies 
that the obligations on internet access providers as laid down in the Telecommunicatiewet will continue to exist 
despite the introduction of the Wbni. As such, providers of internet access have a parallel obligation to both 
Ministries under different laws.61  
2.2.2 Cybercrime & the Dutch criminal code 
The Police Data Act62 and the Criminal Data Act63 regulate data processing for the purpose of criminal 
proceedings. The Dutch Criminal Code (Wvsr)64 lays down material provisions regarding cybercrime. It 
incorporates the Computercrime III Act65 and criminalizes the hacking of computers with the purpose of digital 
theft or with the purpose of using the computer as a listening- or espionage device, as well as prohibitions for 
fencing digital products, grooming and provisions to ensure that undesirable photographs or videos can be taken 
off the internet by court order.66 The Computercrime III Act extends the investigative powers of law enforcement 
with regards to cybercrime to include powers to have encrypted files decrypted and allowing police to hack into 
devices for the purpose of fighting on- and offline crime 
2.3 Governance of Dutch cybersecurity protection 
The concurrence of the Wbni (following the NIS-Directive) and the forthcoming Implementation Law of the 
CSA provides synergies in ensuring a high level of cybersecurity in the Netherlands. The governance of 
cybersecurity in the Netherlands is distributed over a number of entities. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
various actors and their roles, which is elaborated below. 
 
Entity Wbni 
Ministry of Justice • Competent authority for legal implementation 
• Responsible for vital and essential sectors 
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Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy • Competent authority for digital and energy sectors 
• CSIRT for digital sector through the CSIRT-DSP 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management • Competent authority for transportation sectors and 
drinking water distribution67 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport • Competent authority for Health sector68 
De Nederlandsche Bank • Competent authority for the banking sector and 
financial infrastructure69 
NCSC • Central contact point for CSIRTS70 
• CSIRT for vital service providers and providers of 
essential services71 
• Voluntary notifications72 
• See chapter 2.3.1. for overview of all tasks 
NCTV • Coordinator for the performance of tasks by the 
NCSC73 
IBD • CSIRT for municipalities74  
Z-CERT • CSIRT for healthcare services75  
CERT Watermanagement • CSIRT for Waterworks76  
SURFcert • CSIRT for organizations using SURF webhosting 
services77  
Agentschap Telecom (Radiocommunications Agency 
Netherlands) 
- 
Dutch Accreditation Council (Raad voor Accreditatie) - 
AIVD • Has the right to receive information on cybersecurity 
threats and incidents 
Table 2: Overview legal competences of relevant governmental actors in the Dutch Cybersecurity landscape 
 This table demonstrates that the protection of Dutch Cybersecurity relies on a sector-specific approach in many 
entities that rely on the coordination of central bodies such as the NCTV, NCSC and the Radiocommunications 
Agency.78 Due to this decentralized approach, a high level of cooperation and coordination is required. As such, 
initiatives such as the Digital Trust Center (DTC) have been created to stimulate cooperation between the NCSC 
and MinEZK.79 Cooperation between the NCSC, intelligence services and other relevant public players is 
facilitated by the creation of the National Detection Network (NDN) and National Response Network (NRN). 
Similarly, sectoral cooperation is facilitated through the creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs). 80 
2.3.1 The legal mandate of the NCSC 
The NIS Directive lays down an obligation on Member States to adopt a national strategy on the security of 
network and information systems to achieve a high level of cyber security.81 The Netherlands has implemented 
the NIS-Directive by adopting the Network and Information Systems Security Act, appointing the Ministry of 
Justice (in short: MOJ) as the responsible Ministry. The NCSC is part of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and 
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Security.82 Through the Decision on the Organisation of the Ministry of Justice83 (in short Organisational 
Decision) – which lays down the division of competences between departments and organisations within this 
Ministry - the Ministry of Justice has mandated the NCSC with powers and obligations to give proper execution 
to the Wbni, and with that ensure compliance with EU law.84 Following the Wbni and Organisational Decision, 
the NCSC is tasked with the prevention and mitigation of societal disruption deriving from cyber threats and 
incidents and the strengthening of the resilience of the digital Dutch society.85 The NCSC previously was part of 
the NCTV. The Ministry of Justice has decided to provide the NCSC the status of an independent body under 
their Ministry following the implementation of the Wbni.86 However, the NCTV is the national cybersecurity 
coordinator and responsible for Cyber Security and State Threats, providing the NCSC directions as to what 
services to provide.87 
 
 
Figure 2: Organisational structure of the NCSC-NL, source: NCSC website 
The legal mandate for the powers of the NCSC is mostly limited to tasks required to fulfil their obligations under 
the Wbni, which have been delegated to them by the Ministry through the Organisational Decision 
(Organisatiebesluit). Following these laws, the NCSC:  
• Is the Single Point of Contact regarding cybersecurity threats and incidents;88 
• Is the Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) for vital service providers of providers of essential 
services and;89 
• Is responsible for processing voluntary notifications of cybersecurity threats and informing the relevant parties;90  
• Provides support to the providers of vital service providers and other providers that are part of the Dutch 
government to help them take measures to safeguard or restore the continuity of their services;91 
• Informs and advises vital service providers and other providers that are part of the Dutch government and others 
within and outside of the Netherlands concerning cyberthreats or incidents involving the aforementioned;92 
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• Conducts technical analysis and research regarding cyberthreats and incidents in order to safeguard or restore 
the continuity of services and inform relevant players of cyber threats and incidents;93 
• Disseminates information on threats with organisations that have a responsibility to inform the public, CSIRTs 
and providers of internet access or internet communication services.94 
 
Their role under the Wbni and Organisational Decision places the NCSC in a central coordination role between 
the Dutch sector specific CSIRTs, Ministries and makes them the international contact point for the Cybersecurity 
agencies of other Member States.95 Besides the aforementioned roles, the Organisational Decision makes the 
NCSC responsible for holding the secretariat for initiatives in private-public cooperation concerning 
cybersecurity.96 This role for the NCSC is not mentioned in the Wbni, nor is it mandated by the NIS Directive. 
However, considering the multiple private parties that play a role in Dutch cybersecurity, the legal mandate for 
this role may provide interesting opportunities for the NCSC.97 
2.3.2 Other governmental actors in cybersecurity 
Radiocommunications Agency 
The Radiocommunications Agency (Agentschap Telecom) is responsible for a broad range of supervision and 
enforcement activities. This includes (but is not limited to) oversight of the Radio Equipment Directive (RED) 
2014/30/EU98, licensing amateur radio stations and high frequency stations, ensuring the safety of internet 
connected devices.99   
As mentioned, the Radiocommunications Agency will be appointed to fulfil the role of the National Cybersecurity 
Certification Authority (NCCA) for the cybersecurity certification in the Netherlands.100 It will be granted the 
powers to request any information needed from conformity assessment bodies, to conduct audits, to take 
appropriate measures in accordance with national law to ensure conformity assessment bodies or certificate 
holders to comply with the European Cybersecurity scheme.101 To enforce their powers, the AT can impose 
penalties as set out in chapter 5 of the Awb including a lump sum penalty, periodical penalty payments or actual 
reparation to the rightful state, together with complementary powers that will be introduced with the 
Cybersecurity adaptation Law.102  
AIVD and MIVD 
The General Intelligence and Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (AIVD)103 
has a special subdivision that specializes in cybersecurity threats and concerns; the National Bureau for Security 
Connections (NBV)104. The NBV helps to evaluate and develop secure cybersecurity products, has a role in the 
development of cybersecurity standards and has a potential role in certification. Moreover, a part of the NBV, the 
National Distribution Authority (NDA),105 is solely responsible for the registration and distribution of 
cryptographic devices.106 Besides this, the NBV holds positions in several international bodies such as the Council 
Security Committee and the Council Security Committee Infosec that evaluate security products. The NBV 
evaluates holders of cryptographic devices on behalf of NATO and has a supervisory role in the Dutch 
Certification Scheme on IT-Security (NSCIB)107 where the Common Criteria certificates by TÜV Rheinland 
Nederland can be obtained.108 As such, the AIVDs role and influence in the Dutch (and international) 
cybersecurity landscape are significant.  
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The introduction of the Wbni also has consequences for the powers of Dutch intelligence and security services 
such as the AIVD and Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).109 According to the Wbni, any 
information regarding cybersecurity threats or incidents that is retractable to the victimized organisation can be 
shared between the NCSC and the AIVD and MIVD if this is required to prevent the disruption of society, or if 
the NCSC has the explicit consent from the victimised organisation.110  
Digital Trust Centre (EZK) 
The Digital Trust Centre program was set up as a temporary project by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Climate Policy, and will become a permanent part of the MinEZK after 2020.111 Its goal is to make Dutch 
enterprises in non-vital sectors more resilient against cyber-threats. Whilst the Ministry of EZK (AT) fulfils its 
role as CSIRT through its CSIRT-DSP department, the Digital Trust Centre is a platform for the dissemination of 
information and knowledge to digital service providers and for applying for subsidies and grants. According to 
MinEZK, the Digital Trust Centre cooperates extensively with the NCSC: by knowledge sharing between the 
associated parties, the Digital Trust Centre can rely on the expertise of the NCSC to provide digital service 
providers with high quality advice on the precautions they are to take and what technical measures to use.112 
Currently, the DTC does not have an underlying legal competence.113 In the recent evaluation of the functioning 
of the DTC, the government has identified this as a potential problem in the cooperation between the NCSC and 
DTC, since the NCSC does not have legal grounds to share information with the DTC. The formal introduction 
of the DTC into the MinEZK in 2021 may provide a clear scope for the role of the DTC as a part of the Ministry 
and facilitate better cooperation between the organisations.114 
2.3.3 Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) 
The Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) are sectoral network initiatives, developed and operating 
under the lead of NCSC, with the aim to increase digital resilience among the participating organisations. The 
members exchange information on incidents, threats, vulnerabilities, and best practices in cybersecurity in a 
confidential manner.115 ISACs are also developed at European level, with which the national ISAC collaborate. 
The financial and energy sector ISAC were the first ones to be launched in the Union. In the energy sector, the 
EE ISAC,116 has been acknowledged by the European Commission, as a specialised entity promoting cooperation 
among stakeholders.117 The European FI-ISAC was founded in 2008 to support exchange of information between 
banks, CERTs, and law enforcement.118 
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3 Union legislation on cybersecurity certification 
3.1 EU Legislation on Cybersecurity 
3.1.1 Network and Information Security Directive 
The Network and Information (NIS) Directive 1148/2016 lays down measures for the achievement of a high 
common level of security of network and information systems in the Union. Since 2018, the NIS Directive has 
been implemented in all Member States with national laws corresponding to the goals set in the Directive. The 
key pillars of the Directive are: 
• The obligation for each MS to adopt a national strategy and designate national competent authorities. 
• The establishment of a Coordination Group for the exchange of information among MS.  
• The creation of a network of computer security incident response teams (‘CSIRT network’). 
• The obligation for operators of essential services (‘OES’) and digital service providers to adopt security measures 
and notify incidents to the competent authorities (‘incident notification’). 
 
The NIS Directive therefore harmonizes the set-up of authorities in MS, establishes communications and 
information exchange tunnels, and obliges providers of critical services in different sectors to take measures to 
prevent, mitigate and address risks and incidents related to network and information security. The essential 
services are determined in the Directive: energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, health 
sector, drinking water supply and distribution, and digital infrastructure,119 however the implementation by MS 
was recently reported to be quite diverse.120 Similarly, the types of digital services are also predetermined in 
Annex III of the NIS Directive (online marketplace, online search engine, and cloud computing service). The 
obligations of the two types of providers – OES and digital service providers– are not identical, and in that sense, 
it has been argued that the digital service providers are subject to a ‘lightweight’ regime in relation to the OES.121 
To ensure a common approach in terms of security measures to be adopted by OES (Art. 14) and Digital Service 
Providers (Art. 16), the NIS Directive points at standardisation, and in specific European or internationally 
accepted standards and specifications.122 Following this, the European Cybersecurity Agency (‘ENISA’) published 
a report mapping the landscape and identifying gaps in standardisation. The ENISA report examined both formal 
standardisation bodies such as ISO and ETSI, but also informal de facto consortia, the standards of which are well 
accepted in the market and identified a small number of gaps and some areas of overlap. The NIS areas/obligations 
for which standards were identified are: 
• Risk management for networks and information systems (Art. 14 and 15) 
• Impact prevention and minimisation (Art. 14 and 15) 
• Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), Competent Authorities, and Single Points of Contact 
(Art. 7) 
• Identification of Operators (Art. 3) 
 
The NIS Directive does not contain specific provisions on certification. 
3.1.2 Cybersecurity Act 
The new Regulation 881/2019 on ENISA and information and communications technology cybersecurity 
certification (‘Cybersecurity Act’) complements the NIS Directive and strengthens the cybersecurity strategy, 
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coordination, and enforcement of the Union.123 The Regulation provides an enhanced mandate to ENISA in 
relation to the previous regime124 with a multitude of responsibilities and coordination roles, which essentially 
make the Agency the Union center of expertise on cybersecurity.125 ENISA is tasked to:  
• Contribute to the development and implementation of cybersecurity Union policy and law (Art. 5),  
• Assist MS in their capacity building in order to improve prevention, detection and analysis of cyber threats and 
incidents (Art. 6),  
• Support operational cooperation of Union institutions, bodies, agencies, stakeholders (Art. 7),  
• And have an active role in the support, development, and implementation of the cybersecurity certification, as 
explained in the following sections (Art. 8). 
 
In addition, ENISA is given a role of awareness raising, education, technology forecast and analysis on 
cybersecurity.  
The second pillar of the CSA is the introduction of a ‘European cybersecurity certification framework’ for ICT 
products, ICT services, and ICT processes. Since modern ICT products regularly integrate third party technologies 
and components, the Union regulator deemed it significant to ensure that the reliance does not pose additional 
risks and create vulnerabilities that may affect in turn the security of the ICT products, services, and processes.126 
The overall goal of the introduction of the framework was the increase of the level of cybersecurity by enabling 
a harmonized approach to cybersecurity certification at Union level.127 The European cybersecurity certification 
schemes should ensure that certified ICT products, service, processes, comply with requirements that protect the 
availability, authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of data or services.128  
3.1.3 A closer look at the Cybersecurity Act Certification Framework 
A. Essential Components of the certification framework 
The Regulation establishes a framework for European cybersecurity certification, which is a mechanism for the 
establishment of European cybersecurity certification schemes.129 The certification schemes provide requirements 
on the basis of which the level of cybersecurity of an ICT product, or ICT process, or ICT service may be 
assessed.130 The schemes to be established under the European cybersecurity certification framework need to be 
designed to achieve a minimum number of security goals, provided in Art. 51 CSA, such as for example: 
• Protect data against accidental or unauthorised 1. storage, processing, access or disclosure131; 2. Destruction, loss, 
alteration, or lack of availability.132  
• Only authorised persons, programs, or machines access the data, services or functions.133  
• Security by default.134 
 
Type of component CSA framework CSA Provision 
Object of certification ICT products, ICT process, ICT services or groups thereof Rec. 73 
Type of conformity assessment • Third party certification 
• Conformity self-assessment by manufacturer or provider 
also possible for low complexity/low risk situations with 










Voluntary/mandatory Voluntary in principle, mandatory also possible in MS Rec. 91 
Rec. 92 
Art. 56 
Geographical scope Only Union level, no national certifications under the CSA135 Art. 57 
Minimum scheme content Yes, provided in the CSA Rec. 84 
Art. 51 
Mutual recognition Yes, throughout the Union. 




Granularity Three assurance levels (basic – substantial - high) for 
certification. 






Evaluation levels also possible 
Transparency Website with schemes maintained by ENISA 
National authorities notify COM on accredited conformity 
assessment bodies 





Supervision & enforcement By national cybersecurity certification authorities Rec. 73 
Rec. 102 
Art. 58 
Consistency  European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG) Rec. 103 
Revision Every 5 years, evaluation by ENISA Art. 49 
Table 3: Overview of key elements of the CSA certification framework 
To better determine the level of assurance of the European cybersecurity schemes, the Regulation provides for 
different assurance levels that correspond to the level of risk associated with the intended use of the ICT product, 
ICT process, or ICT service.  
While the framework primarily refers to third party conformity assessment (certification), it does allow for 
conformity self-assessment.136 That is the case for low risk ICT products/process/services, for which the 
manufacturer or provider may make a self-assessment and issue an EU statement about the fulfilment of a given 
CSA scheme. The basic essential elements of the European cybersecurity certification schemes are not left at the 
discretion of the scheme drafters, but a thorough non-exhaustive list of minimum components is provided in the 
Regulation.137 This ensures that all the schemes will have a common structure and address common significant 
issues. The schemes are European, and ‘replace’ national ones, in the sense that the latter cease to produce effects. 
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B. Governance of European cybersecurity certifications 
The European cybersecurity certification framework follows a multi-stakeholder model. The initiative of 
requesting candidate schemes lies mainly with the European Commission. The initiative is based on a work 
program for European cybersecurity certification (‘Union rolling work programme for European cybersecurity 
certification’), which announces on an annual basis the Commission’s strategic priority for schemes. As Figure 2 
shows, the Commission requests ENISA to prepare a candidate scheme, ENISA then has the obligation to prepare 
a candidate scheme. In some cases, the Commission or the ECCG may request the preparation of a candidate 
scheme that is not part of the Union rolling work programme, in which case ENISA is not obliged to accept the 
request. There are several embedded guarantees in the procedure to ensure the quality and acceptability of the 
scheme. One of them is the mandatory establishment of ad hoc working groups by ENISA, which are tasked to 
provide specific advice and expertise for each candidate scheme.138 In addition, when preparing the scheme 
ENISA has to consult all the relevant stakeholders, such as standardisation bodies and industry.139 A third 
guarantee is the task of the ECCG to provide expert advice to ENISA for the preparation of the candidate scheme, 
as well as an opinion once the candidate scheme is drafted.140 Once the candidate scheme is finalised, ENISA 
submits it to the Commission, which in turn may adopt the candidate scheme as European cybersecurity 
certification scheme with an implementing act.   
Once the implementing act adopting a European cybersecurity certification scheme is published, it can 
Figure 3: Overview of adoption of candidate European cybersecurity certification scheme 
become operational. Conformity assessment bodies may be accredited to provide services based on the scheme 
and interested parties may apply for certification. The entities that may apply for certification are of two types: 
manufacturers and providers of ICT products/services/processes. The accredited conformity assessment bodies 
are allowed to conduct the process for schemes with basic or substantial assurance level (Art. 56 (4)). By exception, 
private conformity assessment bodies are allowed to issue certificates with a ‘high’ level of assurance only with 
the approval of the national cybersecurity certification authority. The latter may itself also provide certification 
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C. The role of national cybersecurity certification authorities 
The national cybersecurity certification authorities are the cornerstones of the implementation of the schemes. 
While they also participate in the preparation phase, for example via the ECCG, their most significant role 
concerns the phase after the candidate schemes are adopted by the Commission. There are one or more national 
authorities in each MS, designated as the national cybersecurity certification authorities, with a multitude of tasks 
and powers pertaining to monitoring and enforcement. The powers and tasks of the national cybersecurity 
certification authorities may be grouped in the following categories: 
Powers and tasks related to bodies offering conformity assessment 
Actively support and assist the National Accreditation Bodies (NAB) in monitoring and supervising the activities 
of the conformity assessment bodies, providing expertise and relevant information to the NAB.142  
• Request conformity assessment bodies to provide any information they require for the performance of their 
tasks.143 
• Obtain access to premises and carry out audits of CAB to verify compliance.144 
• Monitor and supervise public bodies offering conformity assessment.145 
• In cases of certification schemes with specific or additional requirements, the national cybersecurity certification 
authorities may provide authorisations to conformity assessment bodies to perform such tasks, or restrict, 
suspend, or withdraw such authorisations.146  
• Handle and investigate complaints about certificates issued by national cybersecurity authorities or conformity 
assessment bodies, or about EU statements of conformity.147  
• Take appropriate measures to ensure CAB comply with the Regulation or a European cybersecurity certification 
scheme,148 impose penalties and require the immediate cessation of infringements of the obligations set out in 
the Regulation.149 
Powers and tasks related to manufacturers and providers 
Issue certificates, in case a European cybersecurity certification scheme, requires it in a duly justified manner and 
by way of derogation to the rule that CAB issue certificates.150 
• Supervise and enforce the compliance rules in the certification schemes or the EU statements of conformity in 
case of self-assessments.151 
• Request holders of cybersecurity certificates or EU statements of conformity to provide any information they 
require for the performance of their tasks.152 
• Obtain access to premises and carry out audits of holders of cybersecurity certificates or EU statements of 
conformity to verify compliance.153 
• Take appropriate measures to ensure holders of cybersecurity certificates or EU statements of conformity comply 
with the Regulation or a European cybersecurity certification scheme,154 impose penalties and require the 
immediate cessation of infringements of the obligations set out in the Regulation.155 
Quality monitoring of issued certificates 
Withdraw European cybersecurity certificates issued by national cybersecurity certification authorities or CAB, 
in case they don’t comply with the Regulation or a European cybersecurity certification scheme.156 
• Monitor relevant developments in the field of cybersecurity certification.157 
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Cooperation, information sharing, and notification obligations 
Cooperate with other national cybersecurity certification authorities, other public authorities, and the 
Commission. This obligation includes sharing information about non-compliance of ICT 
products/processes/services with the CSA Regulation or the requirements of certification schemes,158 and sharing 
good practices regarding certification and technical issues.159 
• Notify the Commission of the conformity assessment bodies authorised to provide certification with specific or 
additional requirements per Art. 60(3)160 and request the Commission to remove a CAB from the list.161 
• National cybersecurity certification authorities should be subject to peer review by the equivalent authorities of 
other MS.162 
• Provide an annual summary report to ENISA and the ECCG.163 
• To avoid the potential conflicts of interest from the different type of tasks and powers (for example issuing 
certificates and monitoring bodies offering conformity assessment), there are strict obligations for separation of 
the activities. To safeguard the integrity of the processes and reliability of the schemes, the activities of the 
authorities should be carried out independently from each other.164 In practice, independence may be 
guaranteed by legal, financial, and organisational separation of the groups or authorities within a MS that 
conduct activities with a risk of function creep and conflict of interest. 
3.2 Other relevant legislation 
3.2.1 The Radio Equipment Directive 
The Radio Equipment Directive (RED) provides requirements for radio equipment in order to be placed in the 
market and put into service. The Directive is a harmonized law, thus lays down only the essential requirements 
to be met by the equipment, and the further specification of how entities comply with those requirements is 
provided by harmonized technical standards.165 Radio equipment is highly dependent on cybersecurity, as 
vulnerabilities or malicious attacks may compromise the achievement of the requirements set by the law, and in 
practice render such equipment harmful to the health and safety of individuals.166  
3.2.2 The Regulation on non-personal data flows 
As of May 2018, the Regulation on non-personal data flows applies in the Union.167 The Regulation aims at 
ensuring that non-personal data flow freely in the Union, are available to authorities and can be ported. In 
relation to portability of data, the Regulation urges the Commission to facilitate the development of self-
regulatory codes of conduct, especially covering:168 
• Best practices for switching service providers and the porting of data in a structured, commonly used and 
machine-readable format. 
• Minimum information requirements to be provided to professional users before a contract is concluded. 
• Awareness raising.  
• Approaches to certification schemes that facilitate the comparison of data processing products and services for 
professional users.  
Taking the reference to certification schemes, the European Commission already submitted a request to ENISA 
to prepare a candidate scheme for cloud services.169 
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3.2.3 The General Data Protection Regulation 
The General Data Protection Regulation introduced a novel certification framework (‘data protection 
certification mechanisms’),170 for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with the provisions of the 
Regulation.171 Certification in the GDPR is voluntary, and its territorial scope both national and European. The 
object of certification is one or more data processing operations, and the certification process is conducted by 
either data protection authorities or accredited conformity assessment bodies. The subject matter of the data 
protection certifications under Art. 42 and 43 may be either all-encompassing, in that it covers data controller or 
processor obligations stemming from the entirety of the Regulation, or issue specific. The issue-specific 
certifications may focus on specific aspects of compliance with the legal requirements such as data protection by 
design and by default or security of data processing.172 In fact, ENISA has already identified the close link between 
the Union information security legislation and practices and security of data processing in Art. 32 GDPR.173 In 
that sense, despite the different approach of the certification frameworks in the CSA and the GDPR, bridges could 
be established at least concerning baseline data security elements, such as evaluation of threat occurrence, risk 
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4 Dutch Cybersecurity Certification Landscape: conformity assessment bodies 
4.1 Objectives and approach 
This chapter provides an overview of the certification landscape in the Netherlands. By certification landscape, 
we mean the key market actors, with a focus on the providers of conformity assessment and especially 
certification services,175. This Chapter also includes a section on Public Private Partnerships, due to their 
significance in shaping cybersecurity best practices and requirements in the Netherlands. 
4.2 Standardisation 
The national standardisation body NEN, is active in the field of cybersecurity primarily in standards development, 
which is the core business of NEN, but also has an evolving role in certification scheme management. There are 
several NEN Technical Committees which deal with aspects of cybersecurity, including information security, 
such as the NEN Committee on Information security, cybersecurity, and privacy, as well as several sector specific 
ones such as the NEN Committee on Financial Services.176 
4.3 Conformity assessment bodies 
4.3.1 Accredited v. non-accredited certification bodies and testing facilities 
Accreditation enhances trust to the conformity assessment as it confirms that accredited conformity assessment 
bodies are competent in terms of expertise but also integrity and independence to perform assessments and award 
certifications. The Cybersecurity Act makes accreditation for cybersecurity a formal obligation. The CSA requires 
that certification bodies providing European Cybersecurity certification are accredited by the National 
Accreditation Body, the RvA in the Netherlands.  
There is wide range of certification bodies and testing labs operating in the Netherlands. The number of 
conformity assessment bodies which are formally accredited by the RvA in the field of information security and 
cybersecurity, however, is relatively limited. While the European Cybersecurity certifications are not yet 
published, it is noteworthy that many certification bodies already have the intention of getting accreditation for 
their services. 
4.3.2 Domestic and supranational activity 
Certification bodies in the Netherlands are oriented towards the local market, but often they are branch of a 
larger group of certification bodies either in the form of a network or they belong to the same group of companies, 
with offices and locations in different Member States or even worldwide. This has an impact towards a series of 
issues. One is that while the Dutch market is the target, the preferred standards and certification schemes are 
international or European ones. There are of course exceptions, when there is a need for a national standard, such 
as for example the NEN 7510 on information security in the healthcare sector, which is a broadly used standard. 
Another consequence is the orientation towards collaboration not only with the Dutch regulator at large, but also 
– if not primarily – the European institutions such as the European Commission and ENISA. Certification bodies 
are interested to follow the EU CSA developments and participate in the development of the upcoming 
cybersecurity certification schemes, for instance by joining the ENISA ad hoc working groups. 
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4.3.3 Outsourcing v. internal resources 
The outsourcing of the evaluation process is not uncommon. The interviewed organisations explained that they 
sometimes collaborate with smaller organisations with expertise in complex technical assessments and licensed 
labs performing penetration and other tests. Other organisations opt for utilizing the resources of establishments 
in other countries, belonging to the same mother company. It was reported that smaller organisations lending 
their expert auditors, might be interested to provide certification services autonomously themselves in line with 
the EU cybersecurity certification schemes such as the EU Common Criteria scheme. This is an interesting CSA 
aftermath, which is expected to re-arrange such collaborations, and thus impact the landscape at large. 
4.3.4 Other relevant activities 
Several of the conformity assessment bodies in the Netherlands belong to organisations that also offer consultancy 
services on cybersecurity to their clients. Some organisations explicitly abstain from activities other than 
conformity assessment to ensure that any conflict of interest is presented. Those however that offer consultancy 
services take measures against conflicts, such as separating the units and personnel working on consultancy and 
those working on evaluation and certification in different legal entities. Obligations on taking measures with 
regard to impartiality stem from the ISO/IEC 17065 standard which is the foundation for accreditation of 
conformity assessment bodies. More specificly, certification bodies are not allowed to be the same legal entity 
with consultancies, designers, manufacturers or service providers.177 
4.3.5 Drivers and obstacles for cybersecurity certification 
Achieving a high cybersecurity level in a product, system or service is one of the evident drivers for cybersecurity 
certifications. Even more, the demonstration of an assessment by an independent certification body adds to trust 
and reliability. Reputation with partners and consumers is another strong driver. A competitive advantage (first-
mover advantage) is also reported to be a driver, especially when certification responds to consumer expectations. 
It is also often the case that larger companies require cybersecurity certifications, such as the ISO/IEC 27001, of 
their partners and suppliers. This is the case for example when manufacturers ask from the providers of product 
components to provide evidence of the level of security, in the form of cybersecurity certification. In the domain 
of critical infrastructures, the OES in the Netherlands require their suppliers to be certified, which stems from 
the OES duty of care imposed by the Wbni. However, certification is not mandatory, just an often-preferred 
option. 
Legislation is reported to one of the main drivers for certification. Compliance with a legal requirement to be 
certified was unanimously raised in the interviews with conformity assessment bodies for this Study.  
In the Netherlands, the National Cyber Security Agenda (NCSA), which has set the objectives of cybersecurity 
in the Netherlands for the forthcoming years, stated that the Netherlands aspires to be ́ at the forefront of digitally 
secure hardware and software´ (Ambition nr. 3). To achieve such a goal, the NCSA recognises that standards and 
certification make an important contribution to the digital security of hardware and software.  
In fact, the NCSA refers to the option of mandatory certification for specific product groups in the short term 178 
and a gradual compliance with a CE mark type of seal for all Internet-connected products in the long run.179  
Conformity assessment bodies are in favour of mandatory certification, not only from a commercial point of view, 
but also because in their view it will harmonise and raise the security level of products, systems or services. One 
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interviewed expert explained that when consumers buy a piece of technology, they need to know what the 
security level of this technology is, which is something that can be verified with certification. Apart from the 
consumers, who however, are not always aware of what CE marking for example stands for, B2B relations could 
also benefit from mandatory certification, which would replace the private security assessments currently taking 
place on an ad hoc basis. 
Other indirect ways of semi-mandatory nature are also a strong driver for companies to get certified. Participation 
in procurements is an example of such semi-mandatory certification. 
When it comes to the obstacles, the ratio of costs with added value is brought up as a hindering factor. 
Certification is increasing the price of the product, which is one of the reasons why manufacturers might not be 
willing to certify their products. For some companies, the correction of non-conformities after the assessment by 
the certification body is reported to be quite costly. Another obstacle is liability. As one of the interviewed 
certification experts explained, even if certification is not a legal requirement, it does create liability for the 
company that applies for it:  
“Once a company applies for certification, the evaluation and any non-conformities 
are proof that the company is not in line with the standard.” 
The result of the conformity assessment is formally recorded on paper, which according to the experts, creates 
responsibility for the management of the organisation. This is the case despite the fact that the evaluation reports 
are not published or communicated to the government or the public; the management of the organisation has to 
act on defects when informed in any manner, including an evaluation report of a certification process. 
4.3.6 Relation and role of the NCSC 
Conformity assessment bodies and the Dutch Standardisation Institute are not direct partners with the NCSC. 
Those organisations have collaborated in several occasions with the NCSC and overall value its expertise and 
knowledge.  
The interviewed standardisation experts from NEN acknowledge the significance in NCSC participating in the 
NEN standardisation committees. Despite not having a formal collaboration at the moment, they recognise that 
the participation of NCSC in the standardisation committees allows NCSC to represent the interests of its 
stakeholders. NCSC is working on critical sectors at the moment, and standards are being developed in those 
sectors. Interviewed standardisation experts highlighted that cooperation with governemental organisations such 
as the NCSC are helpful for identification of areas in need of standardisation and certification. 
Conformity assessment bodies are interested to collaborate with the Dutch authorities, and view positively roles 
such as information sharing, awareness raising and publishing information about certified entities. In other 
countries and on a European level, several interviewed CABs are involved actively in shaping developments, via 
participating in working groups or via engaging in consultation. Some CABs are interested to assist the NCSC in 
giving training on cybersecurity certification, should it decide to take on such an activity in the future. Apart 
from any role in certification, some CABs would like to see the NCSC have an active role in standards 
development, which is a view shared by NEN, as mentioned above. 
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4.4 Public Private Partnerships and certification 
A number of strategic Public Private Partnerships with a focus on cybersecurity play a significant role in the field, 
raising the competitiveness of the country in the field. Developed bottom-up, the PPPs aim at bringing the 
collective resilience capacity at its maximum, in place of individual efforts. Within the framework of their goals, 
PPP sometimes engage with specifications development and certification. The market players in the Netherlands, 
often choose to be partners of national and European PPPs. This series of initiatives show that the Netherlands 
relies on significant input and involvement by private parties, addressing multiple facets of cybersecurity 
development.  
Some examples, are:  
• Partnering Trust, an initiative of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, aims at creating uniformity in IT 
requirements of cloud and other service providers through the development of reference frameworks for 
participating organisations. Participating organisations are established also in Germany, France, and 
Luxembourg.180 
• The Dutch Secure Software Alliance (SSA) aims at ensuring that software security is guaranteed from an early 
stage in production of an IT-product, and that the security is safeguarded in every step of its life cycle of a 
product. In order to ensure the quality of products, the SSF relies on the Centre for Information Security and 
Privacy Protection’s (CIP) Secure Software Development Framework.181 
• Cross Sector Cyber Test Bed (CSCT), which is a cross-sectoral platform that allows different sectors to exchange 
test results of cybersecurity testing to develop new standards and norms for cybersecurity.  
• The Zeker-OnLine mark aims to make online service providers safer for users. Zeker-Online provides 
assessments in cloudhosting software for (i) salary administration, (ii) childcare and (iii) accountancy. Currently, 
Zeker-Online has ten participants with a certified cloud application.182 Zeker-Online is also a part of Partnering 
Trust.183 
• The Dutch Payments Association, a sector specific PPP, provides certification services of POS terminals (POI 
devices), based on its own scheme. The scheme sets out conditions for suppliers and manufacturers of POI 
devices. The POI certification is mandatory for the members of the Dutch Payments Association.  
• The European Network for Cyber Security (ENCS), a PPP in the energy sector, focuses on the deployment of 
secure critical energy grids and infrastructure. Dutch energy companies such as ENEXIS and STEDIN, as well as 
Netbeheer Nederland – the branch organisation for all the energy grid management companies in the 
Netherlands- are members of ENCS. The ENCS both develops whitepapers and other documents with 
cybersecurity requirements for its members, but also maintains a test lab, which has the capacity to test against 
security requirements. The ENCS lab works with its own ENCS requirements, but also external normative 
sources for requirements such as the Oesterreichs Energie requirements catalog for end-to-end security for smart 
metering and the Dutch Smart Meter requirements.184 The procedure includes a documentation review, a 
functional testing, robustness testing, and penetration testing. The ENCS does not award certification.  
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5 Dutch cybersecurity certification landscape: vendors and users  
5.1 Market overview 
 The Netherlands is often reported to have a strong competitive cybersecurity market, composed mainly of Small 
Medium Enterprises which provide innovative specialised products and services.185 Large international 
enterprises are also active in the Netherlands, responding mainly to the need for provision of services to Dutch 
multinational companies. The multitude of companies active in the field, as shown in Figure 3 draws a picture of 
a diverse market. Cybersecurity service providers and consultants support organisations by analysing and 
mitigating threats, conducting risk and crisis control, providing advanced solutions. Another range of services in 
the field relates to mobile services, secure cloud services, and infrastructure services. Software providers represent 
another segment of the landscape, as well as ICT manufacturers. In specific, there are companies with several 
products in an area of specialisation such as encryption products, secure identification authentication and digital 
signing solutions, but also mono-liners, specialising on a single product.186 From studying the landscape, it is well 
understood that the companies offering cyber-security services provide preventive and incident, threat and attack 
response services. Another type of company that emerged as active in the field is insurance companies, providing 
compensation for financial loss, and other services such as PR repair of the company and individual reputations.187 
 
Figure 4: The Dutch Cybersecurity market (2018)188according to Value Creation Capital 
The question is how many of those organisations investing in cybersecurity consider cybersecurity certification 
valuable for their business and their supply chain and are actively seeking to get certifications in the field. The 
Cybersecurity monitor 2019, published by the Statistics Netherlands (CBS), reports a number of cybersecurity 
measures undertaken by companies in sectors such as energy, healthcare, ICT. The measures range from 
implementing antivirus software to risk analyses, encryption, VPN and authentication with software or hardware 
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tokens.189 Adherence to standards or certification are not included in the measures, even though some of the 
measures could be informed from available technical standards. In fact, it became quite clear from the interviews 
conducted in the course of the report that it is not seldom that companies consult or conform to standards, but 
choose not to pursue certifications. Second party conformity assessment is also used often instead of certification. 
Vendors or service providers require their supply chain to conform to standards, and this is verified by auditors 
of the vendors, instead of a certification party. This seems to be a faster (and cheaper) solution than certification, 
without however much recognition from other third parties. 
Despite the above issues, certification services in cybersecurity seem to provide a dedicated market share for 
certification bodies in the Netherlands, one that is expected to grow following the developments in legislation 
with the Network and Information Security Directive, the Wbni and most recently the Cybersecurity Act. 
5.2 Case study I: the energy sector 
5.2.1 The Dutch energy sector in a nutshell 
The key energy actors are transmission system operators (‘TSO’), distribution system operators (‘DSOs’) and 
energy suppliers.190 TSOs and DSOs are network operators, responsible for network construction needed for safe 
and security transportation of energy, while energy suppliers directly provide consumers with gas and 
electricity.191 The network operators are under the supervision of the Dutch Authority for Consumers & Markets 
(‘ACM’).192  
Type of actor Energy Actor 
Transmission 
system operators 
Gas Gasunie Transport Services  
Electricity (onshore) TenneT 
Electricity (offshore) TenneT 
Distribution 
system operators 
Gas Cogas infra & beheer – Enduris – Enexis – Liander-RENSO – Stedin – 
Westland - Zebra 
Electricity Cogas infra & beheer – Enduris – Enexis – Liander-RENSO – Stedin – 
Westland 
Table 4 overview of TSO and DSO in gas and electricity the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a competitive market of energy suppliers for gas and electricity, with more than thirty 
suppliers such as Eneco, Engie, Nuon, Essent, Delta Energie, Energiedirect and Greenchoice. 193 
Furthermore, the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (“NAM”) is responsible for onshore and offshore 
exploitation of oil and gas, and the Netherlands Petroleum Stockpiling Agency (“COVA”)194 is responsible for the 
management and supervision of strategic oil stocks.195  
Following the NIS Directive and the Dutch transposition law, a number of actors are appointed as Operators of 
Essential Services (Vitale aanbieders). Both TSOs and DSOs in electricity are currently considered as OES. The 
scope of OES might be extended in the future to include electricity producers. Gas includes additionally the only 
exploration and extraction company in Groningen.196 As regards oil, COVA is the OES. The national competent 
authority responsible for the OES in the energy sector in the Netherlands is the Dutch Telecommunications 
Agency (Agentschap Telecom). 
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With regard to the legal framework, the main national laws regulating the energy sector are the Electricity Act 
1998 (Elektriciteitswet 1998)197, the Gas Act (Gaswet)198, the Heat Act (Warmtewet)199 and the Independent 
Network Management Act (Wet onafhankelijk netbeheer).200201 The Dutch Electricity Act and the Gas Act lay 
down the responsibilities of TSOs and DSOs. Both entities have the duty to safely and efficiently transport and 
distribute electricity and natural gas. They are also tasked with the creation and maintenance of connection points 
that are linked with consumers and other networks.202 The Independent Network Management Act ensures that 
network operators are not allowed to carry out any activities other than the management of electricity and gas 
networks. The national legislation is in line and complemented with the European legal framework on energy, 
such as the regulations establishing the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
(‘ENTSO-E’) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (‘ENTSO-G’). 203 
5.2.2 Activities in cybersecurity  
Cybersecurity is clearly on the agenda of all respondents in the interviews. Guaranteeing uninterrupted energy 
delivery is the core business of TSO, DSO and energy producers. The energy network, distribution nodes, switches 
(the OT environment), but also office IT used for billing, HR, CRM, etc and IoT devices installed at customer's 
home (smart meters, smart thermostats, energy monitors, etc) are vulnerable to attacks and other disruptions.  
The main focus of cybersecurity measures relates to making sure the entire operation meets basic cybersecurity 
requirements. The foundation here is the ISO/IEC 27000 series. All respondents are fully aware of these standards 
and their companies either (informally) adhere to standards in these series or are certified according to these 
standards. The ISO/IEC 27000 series is considered to be the most important set of standards in the energy sector.  
Depending on their specific activities, TSO, DSOs, electricity producers and equipment manufacturers deal with 
specific standards. For instance, smart meters have to conform to NTA 8130, for OT-security ISA99 and IEC 
62443 are relevant.  
The energy sector is fairly specific in terms of hardware, there are few of the shelf components that can be 
deployed in the energy grid. Custom solutions will have to be developed in most cases coming from a relatively 
small set of suppliers. Cybersecurity requirements, consequently will also often have to be developed for specific 
equipment or projects. Many DSOs are members of the ENCS (European Network for Cyber Security). This 
platform plays an important role in developing these custom requirements as well as developing (ad-hoc) 
standards. The ENCS members actively engage in these processes and have access to the ENCS industry standards. 
ENCS also tests components and assesses conformity of these components with the requirements. 
5.2.3 Drivers, needs, and trends in cybersecurity certification 
Certification is expensive because it involves a rationalisation of internal procedures and processes,  
documentation, external audits, assessment and out of pocket costs for the CAB conducting the audits and 
providing the certification. This explains why, although the value of ISO/IEC 27000 are indisputable, not all 
entities in the energy sector go through the process of formal certification.  
A reason to become formally certified is that this may be a legal requirement to operate in a certain market. Due 
to the German legal certification requirements, an energy provider is ISO/IEC 27000 certified for its German 
operations, but not for its Dutch. 
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Mandatory certification is deemed desirable by all respondents, some have drawn a parallel with the GDPR; 
without the GDPR, privacy and data protection would be much lower on the agenda. Having said that, 
determining the required level of certification will not be straightforward. IEC 62433, for instance, defines 
multiple security levels. The lowest level guarantees protection against low-skilled hackers while the highest 
level protects against advanced state actors. Currently, organizations are free to choose which level they want to 
adhere to. The market has not (yet) decided for itself what the minimum security level should be. A mandatory 
minimum level security level for the critical infrastructure could be desirable to create an adequate level playing 
field.  
Another reason to make certification mandatory is that adoption of standards and certification is a slow process. 
Making certification mandatory may help guide industry in the direction of higher cyber security standards. Costs 
and benefits of certification are, however, difficult to predict and it may be too costly for small organisations to 
comply. This makes the decision to mandate cybersecurity certification difficult. 
A driver for some to adopt certification in the industry is that it demonstrates to supervisory authorities (Data 
Protection Authority & AT) and market supervisory authorities (EZK & ACM) that cybersecurity risks are 
actively mitigated. 
Certification also allows parties operating in the energy field (e.g. Siemens) to show the market they comply with 
a certain standard (e.g. IEC 62443 for OT equipment). They have a commercial interest in being certified. It allows 
them to distinguish themselves and it helps in tender processes where customers have many requirements. Being 
certified for certain aspects helps ticking the requirement boxes of these customers. 
From the perspective of buyers of equipment, certification of the supply chain is relevant. Standardization helps 
them compare between multiple vendors and to consider the security of products and services provided by 
suppliers. For the suppliers, it will also be easier to prove they comply with certain standards if they are certified. 
With regards to OT, some parties draft their own requirements/standards which suppliers must comply with, 
which go further than ISO/IEC 27001. 
The respondents from the energy critical infrastructure try to push suppliers towards certification, but the players 
in the Dutch energy market are relatively small and thus have limited market power to persuade big international 
suppliers. Industry platforms (ENCS, ENSTO-E) are used to leverage the power of like-minded companies to 
further standardisation/certification. Collaboration in these European platforms is also important because 
equipment is bought on an international market and European solutions are deemed desirable to ensure the 
devices are of adequate quality and security.  
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Drivers Needs Trends 
Improve security of internal processes 
(through adoption of ISO/IEC 27000 
series) 
Raise company internal awareness of 
importance of cybersecurity 
(relatively slow)  (informal) adoption 
of standards 
Build trust with consumers (smart 
thermostats) through certified IoT 
devices 
Have trustworthy certification 
schemes available 
 
Improve cyber security by requiring 
suppliers to be certified 
 
 
Demonstrate compliance to regulator 
Clarity on (legal) requirements  
Comply with mandatory regulation 
(in Germany) 
Create level playing fields and raise 
cybersecurity 
Increasing call for making 
certification mandatory 
Increasing scope of certifiable 
products/services and submitting 
these to testing/certification 
Expertise to cover specific 
technologies 
Evolution of private standard setting 
and testing initiatives such as ENCS 
Table 5: Drivers, needs and trends in cybersecurity certification: Energy sector 
5.2.4 Relation with and role of NCSC 
The entities in the energy supply chain have regular contacts with the NCSC, for instance through the Energie 
ISAC, particularly to exchange information regarding threats and incidents. The NCSC is seen as a trusted 
communications partner regarding operational cyber security. 
Some entities also have contacts with supervisory authorities, such as AT regarding equipment regulated under 
the Telecommunications Act and Data Protection Authority for GDPR related concerns.  
All respondents remark that they prefer NCSC to maintain their role as a platform for 'informal' information 
exchange. NCSC is seen as a trustworthy entity that facilitates cross sector cybersecurity information. Any move 
towards giving NCSC a role in enforcement would jeopardise trust in NCSC. Their role is seen primarily as a 
knowledge centre for very specific affairs that they can share with the sector. They have insight in threat 
intelligence on a national and international level that goes beyond that of any player in the energy sector.  
The NCSC also have many contacts with foreign (government) entities that one cannot really expect from 
commercial enterprises.  
NCSC is seen by some as being engaged in standardisation. One respondent sees a potential role for NCSC on a 
European level mapping out the needs for the development of standards in conjunction with European ISACs 
and ENISA. ENISA has good deliverables of a high quality and it would be good if such detailed deliverables are 
also issued for the Energy sector, perhaps NCSC could have a role to play in that regard. Another respondent 
stated that as NCSC also has specific guidelines/ standards about information security, it could engage in norm-
setting but in an advisory rather than supervisory role. 
NCSC is considered knowledgeable with regard to the office IT-environment, but less so when it comes to the 
SCADA-environment.  
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Furthermore, a role for NCSC is seen in clarifying the impact of the CSA since there is still a lot of uncertainty 
about this as well providing a roadmap on how to proceed in the next few years.  
There seems to be consensus amongst our respondents that NCSC should maintain the role it has right now: 
facilitating and coordinating on operational cyber security and leaving oversight and enforcement of the various 
obligations to the supervisory authority: AT. Conversely, when it comes to handling incidents and exchanging 
knowledge and information, the AT should not be involved, but keep this function with NCSC. The AT is seen 
as the (future) supervisory authority that is involved ex post to control/ supervise what has happened. 
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5.3 Case study II: the banking sector 
5.3.1 The Dutch banking sector in a nutshell 
The Dutch banking market mostly consists of several large domestic banks. This high level of concentration in 
the Netherlands is – at least in part – a result of past policies that have led to the disturbance of competition in 
the market, which have incentivized banks to grow and to specialize further. Due to this high level of 
concentration, the banks in the Netherlands are relatively large and well organized, for instance through private 
associations such as the ‘Association for Dutch Banks’ (NVB204) and the ‘Dutch Payments Association’ (BVN), in 
which also other payment providers are represented.205 On the European level, associations such as the European 
Banking Frontier (EBF) allow for representation and cooperation on the European level. Moreover, the banks are 
under the supervision of the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Authority Financial Markets (AFM206) on a 
national –and the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Banking Authority (EBA) on a European level.207  
 
Type of actor Services Actors 
Banks Financial services ABN AMRO; Amsterdam Trade Bank; Binckbank; BNP Paribas; 
De Volksbank; ING; Interbank; Rabobank; Van Lanschot; foreign 
banks; other small domestic banks 
Associations Representation and 
cooperation 
NVB; Betaal 
Supervisors Supervision and 
compliance 
Dutch Central Bank; European Central Bank; Authority Financial 
Markets; International Monetary Fund 
Table 6: Overview of key actors: Banking sector 
In principle, supervision on the financial stability and reliability of Dutch banks will happen by the DNB. The 
supervisors at DNB assess the suitability of high executives in banks, granting permits, combating financial-
economic crime, and checking whether institutions are financially strong so that they can deal with any crisis. 
There is an exception however: the ECB supervises banks that hold an exceptional share of European capital. Due 
to the size and concentration of the Dutch market, the ECB directly supervises Dutch banks such as the ABN 
AMRO; BNG Bank; Coöperatieve Rabobank UA; de Volksbank; ING Groep etc. As such, Dutch banks are under 
the shared supervision of the Dutch Central Bank and the European Central Bank. Finally, on a global level the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) can conduct periodical reviews of the financial stability of the Dutch 
financial markets. Besides supervising financial stability, the AFM supervises the way in which banks treat their 
customers and how they cooperate in the Dutch financial market. The supervision by the AFM is aimed at the 
protection of consumers and to increase consumer trust.  
In order to regulate the Dutch banking sector, Dutch banks rely on a combination of domestic and European 
laws. On the domestic level, the reliability of Dutch banks is arranged through the Financial Supervision Law 
(Wft208). This law is supervised by DNB. Moreover, the Dutch financial institutions are bound by the Law for the 
Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism (Wwft209), the Law on the Supervision of Trust Funds 
(Wtt210) and the Sanctions Law (Sw211). These laws ensure the integrity of the Dutch financial system, the 
prevention of crime and the punishment of illegal behaviour respectively. The Wtt is under the supervision of 
the DNB, the Wwft is supervised by the AFM and other authorities and the Sw is supervised jointly by the DNB 
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and AFM. On a European level, banks are bound by legislation such as the Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2), 
to ensure access to consumer data by innovative payment services.212 
5.3.2 Activities in cybersecurity  
Important legislation concerning cybersecurity in the banking sector are the Wbni on the domestic level and the 
NIS-Directive (and soon the CSA) on a European level. Under the Wbni, the DNB has been appointed as the 
responsible authority for dealing with cybersecurity threats- and incidents in the banking sector. Banks that 
encounter cybersecurity threats will notify this to the DNB and AFM, which in turn will determine whether the 
NCSC and ENISA need to be informed. As such, financial institutions are subjected to overlapping notification 
obligations in cybersecurity incidents between cybersecurity and financial authorities. Moreover, banks are 
already required to demonstrate a high level of security – including cybersecurity – under their existing legal 
obligations towards the Financial Supervision Law (Wft). The law imposes a general obligation on banks to 
provide due diligence concerning the safety of consumer finances (zorgplicht).213 The AFM periodically assesses 
whether financial institutes meet these obligations, including whether cybersecurity is sufficiently safeguarded. 
The AFM expects ‘robust’ security measures for cybersecurity from the banks. In order to ensure that they meet 
this high level of protection, banks may rely on generally accepted information security frameworks such as the 
ISO/IEC 27001 norms and the NIST CSF frameworks, or PCI norms for the distribution of payment cards.214 
However, following their obligations to the AFM, banks are free to choose how they fulfil their due diligence 
obligation. This allows for heterogeneous approaches to cybersecurity whilst not excluding innovative solutions. 
It is for this reason that the respondents in the interviews believed that cybersecurity is sufficiently safeguarded 
in the Netherlands, and that extensive mandatory certification schemes would not be desirable. However, 
respondents do believe that voluntary certification schemes imposed on their commercial partners in IoT, Cloud 
and other digital products may be beneficial for commercial interests. This type of certification would allow banks 
to demonstrate the security of the products they acquire towards the Authority for Financial Markets, and may 
be a selling point for the providers of cybersecurity products.  
5.3.3 Drivers, needs, and trends in cybersecurity certification 
The main drivers for obtaining cybersecurity certification in the Dutch banking sector in general are primarily 
to demonstrate compliance with the due diligence obligations that they have towards the supervisory authorities. 
However, the respondents in the interview argue that certification in itself is not required to provide this 
guarantee of a high level of security. In fact, certification of the banks is considered to demonstrate a proper 
organisation of management processes, rather than ensuring a high level of security overall. Banking services 
actors however value cybersecurity certifications, since the market for cybersecurity products is marked by a 
high level of newcomers with heterogeneous products. As such, certification is important to the extent that it 
helps banks identify reliable trading partners. Respondents do note that certification should not be too restrictive 
or costly, since this may hinder the provision of innovative products by start-ups, or drive suppliers of low cost 
products out of the market due to the costs of compliance. As such, respondents strongly prefer voluntary 
certification rather than mandatory certification, since this allows for heterogeneity in both the offered products 
and the providers offering them. Besides the commercial benefits that certification may provide in trading with 
the providers of cybersecurity and IoT products, European standards may facilitate cross border business flows 
between banks. Certification ensures that banks from different EU (or global) countries adhere to the levels of 
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cybersecurity protection desired by Dutch banks. Due to the rapid developments in the proliferation of new 
cybersecurity products and the regulation of cybersecurity in the banking sector, European certification may help 
to clarify and harmonize the rules concerning cybersecurity in banking sectors of different Member States. The 
drivers, needs and trends in cybersecurity can be summarized as follows: 
Drivers Needs Trends 
Identification of reliable trading 
partners 
Voluntary certification, should allow 
a high level of heterogeneity  
Certification schemes are being 
developed for IoT and Cloud    
Cross-border cooperation and 
business flows between banks 
Cross-border harmonization; 
certification on European level 
There is an increasing intensity of 
European legislation on cybersecurity  
Demonstrating compliance with legal 
obligations 
Clarity on rules of the certification 
scheme 
Increasing compilation of various 
standards and norms through 
certification schemes 
Table 7: Drivers, needs and trends in cybersecurity certification: Banking sector 
5.3.4 Relation with and role of the NCSC 
Regarding the NCSC, interviewed organisations consider the NCSC to have a high level of expertise and an 
important role in facilitating contact between different partners in cybersecurity and the dissemination of 
information. Moreover, one of the respondents argued that the operational role of the NCSC is fulfilled well, that 
they would prefer if the scope of their operational role was extended to include non-vital sectors as well. Another 
view was that the powers of the NCSC in responding to cybersecurity threats should be extended, allowing the 
NCSC to take more decisive action. However, none of the respondents see a role for the NCSC as a certification 
authority for two reasons:  
the NCSC is seen as an excellent knowledge partner, and the role of certification authority would result in a 
conflict of interest between a support and supervision task and;  
the NCSC may not have the organizational capacity to fulfill a certification role. However, one of the respondents 
does note that the NCSC could provide an important role in collecting information on all European requirements 
concerning cybersecurity and help (financial) institutes with implementing measures to comply.  
  
Cybersecurity Certification Insights  
 
46 
6 State of the art and new developments in standardisation and certification  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a snapshot of the most commonly used standards for conformity assessment in cybersecurity, 
as shown in the literature and the empirical research conducted for this Study. It also depicts the latest 
developments with regard to the Cybersecurity Act and elaborates on views of the Dutch cybersecurity 
certification stakeholders on the potential impact from an organizational and operational perspective. 
6.2 Standards  
6.2.1 Formal standards as key component to certification 
The research for this study, including the interviews and information received from conformity assessment 
bodies, points at the direction of formal standardisation from international, European, and national 
standardisation bodies being a key component to existing certifications in the field of cybersecurity. Unlike other 
fields where requirements and criteria for certification are often drawn by other sources such as the law,215 
standards are essential for cybersecurity certifications. Formal standards, developed by the recognised 
standardisation bodies, have a particularly significant role to play in relation to harmonised legislation, such as 
the Radio Equipment Directive, which covers aspects of security, but also to the forthcoming CSA certifications. 
6.2.2 Non-formal standards and SMEs 
Not only formal standards developed by the recognised standardisation bodies,216 are used as a foundation for 
certification. Also specifications developed by specific individual (or groups of) vendors may impose their own 
conditions to respective partners and hence act as standards for compliance. Furthermore, a certification 
procedure against a recognised standard requires extensive documentation in addition to testing, which is 
reported to raise the overall costs for obtaining the certification.  
As a result, some conformity assessment bodies opt to offer certification services also for non-formal standards, 
when for example a client has low risk processes or is a start-up or a Small Medium Enterprise (SME). This is an 
interesting connection with the possibilities introduced in the CSA for self-assessment in low risk cases and the 
option of manufacturers to issue declarations of conformity.217  
6.3 Cross-sector cybersecurity standardisation and certification 
While there are a multitude of technical standards in the market, the standards used for accredited conformity 
assessment in cybersecurity, as shown in this Report, are a handful. The standards, which are pivotal to 
cybersecurity and cybersecurity certification in specific, originate mostly from international standardisation 
bodies, and to a lesser extent, European ones. The cybersecurity standards used in conformity assessment relate 
to products, management systems and services. While there are sector specific standards adopted by 
organisations,218 a characteristic example of which is the banking sector, the most common ones are generic, 
sector-neutral standards. In some cases, initiatives developing a sector specific specification on the basis of a 
generic standard were mentioned during the interviews, as a best practice worthy of attention. An example of 
such a standard is the NEN 7510, which is the adaptation of the 27001 to the healthcare sector information 
security needs in the Netherlands. 




6.3.1 ISO/IEC 27001: Information Security Management Systems 
By far the most commonly used standard from conformity assessment bodies and their clients is the ISO/IEC 
27001 standard on information security management. The ISO/IEC 27001 establishing, implementing, 
maintaining and continually improving information security practices in organisations. The standard is reported 
to deal with complex IT systems, assessing each organisation in context. Further, its security-by-design approach, 
which requires the information security management system to be integrated with the organisations’ processes 
and management structure already from the design of processes, systems, and controls, is considered one of its 
strong assets.219 Oftentimes, conformity to the ISO/IEC 27001 is a requirement imposed by industry actors to their 
supply chain partners, especially in the critical infrastructure domain. Certification in line with the ISO/IEC 
27001, apart from the benefits it might bring to the information security of an organisation, is also an element of 
trust. It should also be noted that ISO/IEC 27001 may include additional components in a certification process, 
such as the requirements based on the ISO/IEC 27018 on cloud computing or the ISO/IEC 27701 standard for 
privacy information management.220 
6.3.2 Common Criteria: Product Certification 
The ISO/IEC 15408 is an international standard used for IT security evaluation. Common Criteria, allow in brief, 
a product developer to tailor an evaluation to the security needs of its product, by choosing an Evaluation 
Assurance Level (EAL). The 7 available Evaluation Assurance Levels, which stand for different tests, reflect a 
granular approach, also followed in the European Cybersecurity Act, despite with less assurance levels.  
Achieving a high EAL and receiving certification for it, boosts trust in a product, and is often required, by 
counterparties before entering into commercial collaboration agreements.  
Common Criteria certification is often connected to both commercial and reputation benefits. Apart from a 
competitive advantage it might offer, it is perceived as reflecting quality and reliability. While organisations 
recognize that the higher the EAL is, the more costly the process, they are willing to go through certification. 
This does not apply for Small Medium Entreprises and start-ups. 
In the Netherlands, TÜV Rheinland Nederland is currently appointed by the AIVD to administer the Dutch 
Common Criteria scheme (NCSIB)221 and provide certification services. TÜV Rheinland collaborates with 
different evaluation facilities in the Netherlands. 
6.3.3 IEC 62443 on Cybersecurity for Industrial Automation and Control Systems 
The IEC 62443 standard series provides a framework to address security vulnerabilities in industrial automation 
and control systems (IACS). The standards are applicable to all sectors. IEC 62443 series adopt a quite broad scope 
including security of “computers, networks, operating systems, applications and other programmable 
configurable components of the system.” The standards also cover SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition) systems, which are commonly used by critical infrastructure organisations. The 62443 standards 
complement ISO/IEC 27701, and follow a modular approach, adapting to the different organisations, making it a 
flexible framework, which also explains its broad adoption. Conformity to the IEC 62443 is seen as demonstrating 
the status of digital resilience of an organisation as a whole.222The standard series is mentioned in the proposal for 
a Common Regulatory Framework on Cybersecurity of the United Nations Economic and Social Council223 




6.3.4 Other specifications 
Cryptography standards are also among the commonly used standards, however not for certification. An example 
is the FIPS 140-2/ISO 19790 standard on security requirements for cryptographic modules.224  
Informal standards and technical specifications not developed by the formal standardisation organisations, play a 
role due to the speed of development of the specifications, in combination with the deep knowledge of 
technological advancements. An example of the Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme (NESAS), which 
provides a security baseline to evidence that a network equipment satisfies predefined security requirements, 
covering areas such as software integrity protection, information management vulnerability, and security by 
design.225 Other specifications are the result of the collaboration of multiple standardisation actors in a given 
technology or use case such as the 3GPP in the telecommunications technologies, which is a partnership among 
seven telecommunications standard development bodies.226 Additional examples provided during the interviews 
were the SANS TOP 20, which is a set of critical security controls for Cyberdefence,227 and OWASP specifications 
and guidance. 
6.4 Sector specific initiatives in standardisation and certification  
6.4.1 ETSI 303 645: Internet of Things and cybersecurity certification 
While the current study does not have a particular focus on Internet of Things standardisation and certification, 
the research revealed that IoT cybersecurity is a rapidly emerging field for conformity assessment. The Dutch 
Standardisation Institute actively joins standardisation activities in the international and European arena through 
the national committee members of its IoT Security and Privacy Committee, in which organisations from 
different sectors such as the banking sector, conformity assessment, research and the regulator, participate.228  
A prominent example of ongoing standardisation work in the field of IoT, which is likely to be a reference point 
for conformity assessment activities is the recent ETSI work on Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things, 
providing baseline requirements.229 As one interviewed expert stressed: “Safety is impossible without 
cybersecurity. It is impossible to think about any of the IoT devices without thinking about cybersecurity. This 
is one of the main reasons why we focus on the cybersecurity of the IoT devices.” 
The standard is reported to aim at allowing vendors that lack experience in cybersecurity to implement the 
requirements of the standard.230 Furthermore, ENISA has identified the draft ETSI EN 303 645 standard as a basis 
of a potential candidate European cybersecurity certification scheme on smart home IoT devices.  231 
In brief, the current version of the draft European Standard (EN) purports to combine good security practices. 
The draft EN provides baseline requirements that are outcome-focused, so that the means of achieving a given 
requirement are left to the organisations conforming to the standard. Furthermore, ETSI is currently developing 
a technical specification (ETSI TS 103 701) to be used by testing labs and certification bodies assessing consumer 
IoT products against the provisions of the EN 303 645. The technical specification is also intended as an input to 
a future European Cybersecurity certification scheme on this topic.232 
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6.4.2 Banking sector and energy 
The banking sector, including banks, is a very well-regulated sector. Several standards are recommended by the 
European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank on a range of topics, including cybersecurity. There 
are several international standards followed by the organisations active in the sector, as well as European 
harmonised standards. Apart from the cross-sector standards such as the ISO/IEC 27000 series, the Cybersecurity 
framework from NIST and COBIT standards, sector-specific standards are often linked to Union legislation such 
as the Payment Services Directive.233 Banks also follow the PCI Security Standards Council’s standards, such as 
the PSI standard for card distributors and other non-formal standards such as the ORX Reference taxonomy for 
operational and non-financial risk.234 Conformity to standards is often not certified. Nevertheless, when 
organisations in the sector opt for certifications, it usually relates to products and systems, especially technologies, 
since such certifications reduce information asymmetries between software providers and software users. 
The energy sector uses the above standards, such as the ISO/IEC 27001, the IEC 62433 and others. Another 
standard mentioned in one of the interviews is the NTA8130 on smart grids, which is a Dutch national standard, 
currently withdrawn. In general, the network operators in the Netherlands follow the same standards for Smart 
Meters, in line with guidelines from the Netbeheer Nederland. In IT security however, each operator has its own 
IT security and selects to which standards it conforms. Furthermore, the requirements of the European Network 
for Cybersecurity were mentioned as an example followed by Dutch network operators. Those however are not 
followed by certification. The suppliers need to be certified usually against ISO/IEC 27001 to meet the 
requirements met by the energy company.  
6.4.3 Commission requests to ENISA for preparation of candidate schemes 
There are currently two ongoing initiatives for development of European cybersecurity certification schemes on 
the basis of the Cybersecurity Act. One scheme concerns ICT product certification, and the other concerns 
services certification. 
With regard to the product certification scheme, the European Commission requested ENISA to prepare a scheme 
in line with Art. 48 (2) CSA. The aim of the candidate scheme will be to serve as a successor to the existing Senior 
Officials Group Information Systems Security (SOG-IS)235 Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA). The aim is to 
both respect the successful aspects of the current SOG-IS MRA, such as authorizing both certification bodies and 
testing laboratories, but also improve other aspects in line with the CSA, such as by introducing a maximum 
validity period of certificates.236  
The future EU Common Criteria scheme (EU CC) will address necessary requirements as provided in Art. 54 CSA 
and will also provide a mapping to the security objectives outlined in the Cybersecurity Act. In addition, the 
EUCC will include certification of Protection Profiles. Other issues addressed are recommendations for further 
guidance and the maintenance of the scheme, competences of skills of auditors, on spot audits and peer 
assessments, requirements for design.237 A significant element is expected to be the definition of conditions for 
the promotion of the certified products, such as the introduction of an easily recognizable seal and a QR code 
associated with issued certificates. 
The European Commission also requested ENISA in line with Art. 48 (2) CSA to prepare a candidate certification 
scheme on cloud services. The scope of the cybersecurity certification scheme is requested to address: 
• Stimulation of the uptake of cloud services among users. 
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• User trust to cloud services and the provision of cloud services by service providers.  
 
The candidate scheme is intended to consider the guidance and work of the Cloud Service Provider Certification 
(CSPCERT) Working Group, a platform of private and public entities, supported by the European Commission.238 
In addition, the scheme is envisaged to further support data mobility and compliance with the EU legal 
framework on non-personal data flows and the General Data Protection Regulation.  
 
Basic Substantial High 
Shows an intention from 
the Cloud Service provider 
to implement security 
controls 
Shows the correct 
implementation of security 
controls 
Shows the effectiveness of 
the controls implemented 
Deals with simple known 
attacks 
Deals with known attacks 
by actors with limited 
means 
Deals with complex attacks 
using SOTA techniques 
Document review Functional testing Pen testing 
Entry level, low risk 
applications 
Core level with real 
guarantees for mainstream 
applications in all fields 
Strong guarantees, for 
critical issues in sensitive 
cases 
Table 8: Assurance levels in the candidate cloud services cybersecurity certification scheme239 
The candidate scheme follows the terminology established in the ISO/IEC 17788, and covers infrastructure, 
platform, and application.240 It is designed to be horizontal, in the sense that it defines baseline controls applicable 
to all services, and can be reused and refined in vertical schemes.241 
6.5 Impact on the Dutch Landscape 
The Cybersecurity Act influences the Internal Market, and inevitably every Member State. While it is still early 
to assess the impact of the CSA on the Dutch cybersecurity certification landscape, several CSA provisions are 
expected to have direct and indirect impact on the identified cybersecurity certification actors. The direct impact 
is rather evident: a national cybersecurity certification authority vested with several related powers will be 
designated, provisions such as the standstill obligation of Art. 57(1) CSA will priotise European cybersecurity 
certifications over national ones, and others. The indirect impact, which is the focus in this section, is linked to 
the stirring of the market that is expected to occur with the development and adoption of the European 
cybersecurity certifications. Market players will have to make a decision on whether to be engaged with the new 
certifications, either by offering or consuming certification services.  
6.5.1 Conformity assessment bodies 
Conformity assessment bodies, including testing labs and certification bodies, are following the developments at 
European level or -to a smaller degree -participate in those. The core business of CABs offering services on the 
basis of the standards and specifications discussed earlier in this Chapter is not expected to change dramatically, 
according to the interviewed experts. Commonly used standards such as the ISO/IEC 27001 are developed in a 
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manner that are flexible enough to account for regional laws and developments. In addition, the first Commission 
requests showed an intention to take on board existing best practices, such as the Common Criteria, which will 
add to a smooth adaptation of CABs, which are already familiar with Common Criteria evaluations.  
Several certification bodies consider the cybersecurity 
framework as a good business opportunity and intend to 
expand their services to the European Cybersecurity 
certification schemes, once published and available. This 
includes applying for accreditation for those schemes. Some 
certification bodies are even interested to shape the 
developments via for example the ENISA ad hoc working 
groups or by participating in the committees of the national 
standardisation body NEN. On top of certification services, CABs may also offer trainings and information 
sessions. 
Some CABs also show hesitation. This relates to how successful the European cybersecurity certification schemes 
will be in practice, and whether there will be market demand for those new certifications. In that case, a more 
passive stance is adopted, that monitors the developments and waits to see their actual value and use in practice. 
The fact that the CSA schemes will be based on a law, does not 
necessarily mean, according to an expert, that there will be 
demand. The certification mechanisms of the General Data 
Protection Regulation was brought as an example, as according 
to the expert “there was a lot of discussion, but the market for 
certification is close to zero.” 
Furthermore, concerns were voiced about the speed with which 
developments at Union policy making level occur, especially considering the speed with which cyber threats are 
spread. Those concerns point at the direction of Dutch national schemes, at least until the Union schemes are 
available. Another expected impact relates to the current collaboration among certification bodies and other 
organisations providing auditor or testing expertise to the CBs, as it is likely that more bodies will be interested 
to get accredited and provide certification services for the new schemes. Thus, former collaborators in that case 
will become competitors, and current CBs will have to find other ways to complement their resources in terms 
of expertise in order to maintain their market position. 
It should be kept in mind that while we are speaking of the ‘Dutch’ certification landscape, the stakeholders – 
both in terms of conformity assessment bodies and the industry – often belong to multinational mother 
companies. This sometimes (but not always, as seen above) changes the perspective of the focus being on the 
domestic situation. For example, one interviewed expert from a certification body said “We are interested in 
international and European developments more than national ones, as we are a multinational company with 
many locations globally.” 
If you read the new regulation [CSA], it is 
quite easy to find many new services. The 
CSA covers IoT, Cloud Services, e-health 
records, qualified trust service providers. 
 
[interviewed conformity assessment expert] 
It is better first to develop a national 
scheme. It lacks at the moment; we 
are missing a lot of opportunities to 
secure the country.  
[interviewed cybersecurity expert] 
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Another issue relates to the management of certification schemes. A reliable certification scheme needs to be 
properly maintained, updated, and managed. NEN 
is currently growing in this role of scheme 
operator, and it positions itself as an independent 
organisation, with close touch with the market. 
Those are both essential elements for a 
certification scheme. Indeed, as seen in the CSA 
legal analysis, while the preparation and 
publication of the candidate schemes is centralized at EU level, with ENISA and the European Commission as 
key actors, the operationalization and governance of the schemes is rather left at the MS.  
6.5.2 Industry 
The banking sector in the Netherlands is informed on the latest developments on European cybersecurity from 
the European Banking Federation, the Dutch Central Bank, the Dutch competition authority (ACM) or other 
organisations within the sector. 
Experts from the interviewed organisations find that the banking sector is not a priority for a candidate European 
cybersecurity certification scheme, and because this is a very well regulated market, the uptake of voluntary CSA 
certifications will be limited in this sector. Interviewed experts argued that the uptake of voluntary certification 
would mostly be driven by compliance consultancies, as happened with the ISO/IEC 27000 standards. There will 
likely be a significant impact in the market in general in areas linked to the banking sector, such as cloud, 5G, 
and IoT. Especially in IoT, certifications will drive companies to invest more in cybersecurity measures. At the 
same time, IoT CSA certifications will offer some structure on how to deal with such product security issues in 
complex financial institutions. The banking sector expects that the cost of conformity to CSA certifications might 
drive out of the market some smaller parties, which are currently offering products for low prices. Concerns are 
voiced about the new certifications and possible over the top rigid assessment methodologies, as those might 
hinder innovation in the market.  
As regards the energy sector, the Cybersecurity Act does not have full impact yet on the cybersecurity agendas 
of the interviewed energy companies. It is seen as a stimulus for standardisation and mandatory certification. A 
push towards standardisation and (mandatory) certification from Brussels – in place of nationally instigated - is 
generally welcomed by the respondents because of the international and European market. Policy on 
cybersecurity certification will have to come from the European level, while the operational part in relation to 
cybersecurity certification should be managed on a national level. Alignment is important, it would for instance 
be undesirable for a German electricity OES to be certified under ISO/IEC 27001, while the Dutch counterpart 





The important question with certification schemes 
developed at European level is “who is going to 
manage it?” Because once you have delivered the 
scheme, it needs to be maintained. It is a living 
thing. 
[interviewed standardisation expert] 
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7 Inventory of Potential roles for the NCSC 
7.1 Introduction, approach and explanation 
The following sections outline an inventory of potential roles for the NCSC in the evolving cybersecurity 
certification landscape in the Netherlands. The potential roles stem from the building blocks of this report: the 
analysis of the current legal framework on cybersecurity certification in the Netherlands including NCSC’s legal 
mandate, the new ‘opportunities’ created by the EU Cybersecurity Act and relevant legislation, and the research 
on the status, needs, trends, drivers and obstacles, of the stakeholders in the Netherlands, as gathered from the 
desktop and empirical research. 
Each option is presented as follows: First, there is a short description of the background and rationale of the ‘role’. 
Then, the specifics of the role are fleshed out with suggestions on how to move forward or grow further in an 
already existing role, followed by an explanation and a summary table.  
The roles are classified as: 1) Supportive 2) Reactive and 3) Proactive.242 The supportive roles lay down functions 
for NCSC which do not place the NCSC at the forefront, but presuppose work in the background, providing 
advice and support to other stakeholders. The reactive roles are mostly functions where the NCSC acts when 
requested, as response to an incident or an application for example. The proactive roles are functions that the 
NCSC plays a central pivotal role in taking decisions and initiatives. It should be noted that the option of ‘no role’ 
in the landscape is also a realistic scenario. However, this section reflects on a range of options in reaction to the 
legal framework and the stakeholder needs and drivers, as identified in the research for this study.  
Given that the NCSC has a very specific legal mandate, the main focus is on roles of a supportive/reactive nature. 
The roles that do not fit in the current mandate of the NCSC do not intend to suggest a structural change of the 
regulatory landscape, but are reported as an outlook for further research. Furthermore, this section should be 
seen as a thought provoking exercise that will stir discussion on the future positioning of the Agency in the 
changing landscape. As mentioned in the scope and limitations of the Study in the Introduction, an assessment 
of societal impact or organisational and capacity considerations within the Agency is not in the scope of this 
Report. Last, this is not meant to be an exhaustive systematic analysis, and the roles provided in this section 
should not be seen as recommendations for the NCSC, but as possible directions that NCSC or other parties could 
pursue to strengthen cybersecurity through certification mechanisms. 
The six roles elaborated below are: 
Role 1:  Facilitator of knowledge sharing (supportive role) 
Role 2:  Awareness raising and training (supportive role) 
Role 3:  Provide assistance to the national cybersecurity certification authority in its tasks 
(supportive/reactive role) 
Role 4:  Provide knowledge and expertise during accreditation of certification bodies (reactive role) 
Role 5:  Contribution to development of standards and certifications (reactive role) 
Role 6: Develop own scheme (proactive role) 
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Role 1: Facilitator of knowledge sharing (supportive role) 
Background. The NCSC currently plays a role of providing a cybersecurity collaboration platform. This role 
is performed mainly through the Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC). While the NCSC is holding 
the secretariat, the ISACs are a shared responsibility with the industry participants (for organizing meetings, etc.), 
providing a structured but flexible governance model. The interviews with the energy and banking sectors 
showed that dissemination of information and partner consultation are strong points of NCSC’s current 
functioning, a role in which the Agency can grow further. The NCSC is seen as a trusted partner, facilitating the 
exchange of information among the participants of each ISAC. 
The current voluntary incident reporting by actors outside the vital sector could expand in terms of range of 
relevant topics and partners. As it was mentioned during an interview, the division between vital and non-vital 
sectors starts to become obsolete. Information coming from non-vital sectors can be useful to vital sectors, and 
vice versa. In this sense, knowledge should be exchanged further than the direct partners of the NCSC, to a 
broader circle of partners and collaborators. Since the NCSC mandate is limited to vital sectors, the broadening 
of partnerships can be done on a voluntary basis, and in collaboration/coordination with other competent 
authorities. 
Possible ways to grow. 
A. Expansion in terms of range of topics. In growing in its role as facilitating information exchange and 
collaboration, best practices and tools for cybersecurity, the NCSC could serve as an information platform for 
new developments and updates regarding cybersecurity standards and certifications obtained by its partners. A 
similar role is maintained by several other cybersecurity authorities or agencies in other countries: 
• The Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium, coordinates the security evaluation and certification of information and 
communication systems,243 
• In Luxembourg, there is a dedicated objective in the National Cybersecurity Strategy to maintain an inventory of 
standards and good practices in different sectors.244 
• In Italy, the agency publishes guidelines, standards, best practices and taxonomies in order to facilitate 
information sharing.245 
 
This function may include developments on European Cybersecurity certification schemes and can have a double 
function: to inform the Dutch market players about the latest developments, and inform other MS about the 
cybersecurity certification landscape in the Netherlands. This is not to suggest that the NCSC would play a role 
of consultancy, advising its partners on how to implement certifications. The role under discussion in this section 
rather relates to an ‘information hub’, similar to roles of the agencies of other countries, as seen in the examples 
above. 
In collaboration with the AT in its forthcoming capacity as the national cybersecurity certification authority, this 
role could expand even more as the NCSC could be the designated public registry holder for European 
cybersecurity certifications. Such a registry could maintain public information on:  
• All the published European cybersecurity certification schemes;  
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• The accredited certification bodies in the Netherlands that offer certification services in line with the EU 
Cybersecurity Act, their scope, specialization. This can also be done in collaboration with the National Accreditation 
Body (RvA);  
• The details of certification holders (company details, certificate and summary of evaluation report, expiry date of 
certificate, etc.) and other information, similar to the website intended to be maintained by ENISA (Art. 50 CSA). 
 
B. Expansion in terms of partners. While sector-specific ISACs and in general, collaboration platforms of that 
type bring a value to their participants in being sectorial, as they address the particularities and specific needs of 
the sector, there is a reported missed opportunity from not sharing information across sectors. Working in sectors 
fosters working in silos, whereas valuable information such as about ransomware, could help prevent incidents 
in other sectors.  
This cross-sector exchange could also be useful in the domain of the European cybersecurity certifications. 
Information on the implementation of the baseline requirements of an IoT or a cloud services scheme, for 
example, is valuable in all sectors. Even more, if a European cybersecurity certification scheme would become 
mandatory, either with a national or a Union act, the sharing of information, experiences on implementation, 
strengths or weaknesses among certification holders would be strengthening compliance with the scheme rules.  
Apart from the vital sectors, organisations such as standardisation bodies, conformity assessment bodies, and the 
National Accreditation Body would also benefit from the type of knowledge shared within the various 
collaborations of the NCSC. Such partners could join such partnerships as ‘observers’, learning from the latest 
developments and updating their own modus operandi and especially evaluations, risk assessments, use cases etc. 
At the same time, this would potentially bring added value to the industry participants, learning from the 
experience of conformity assessment bodies that work cross-sector and in different countries. Informally, this 
role can be seen as a capability and capacity building exercise in terms of conformity assessment in cybersecurity 
in the Netherlands. 
In Luxembourg, the national standardisation body ILNAS, has formally been assigned a role in the National 
Cybersecurity Strategy in helping with information sharing about standards.246 
Discussion. In holding the secretariat of existing ISACs, the NCSC already has the network and the know-
how to expand such collaborations cross-sector, or even with new formal partnerships with conformity 
assessment bodies. The expansion of the current role of facilitating information sharing on cybersecurity 
certifications is justified within NCSC’s current mandate, because standards and certifications are best practices 
and tools used among NCSC’s partners. This is also the case for expanding NCSC’s voluntary collaborators to 
include conformity assessment bodies. The CSA offers the opportunity for growing in this role, since the law 
requires monitoring of relevant developments in the field of cybersecurity certification (Art. 58(7)(h) CSA). 
Nevertheless, if the NCSC would take on a formal role as being the designated public registry holder for European 
Cybersecurity certifications, this would require strong collaboration with the AT. An alternative option for the 
NCSC is to maintain such a registry in a more informal manner for the purposes of informing the AT as national 
cybersecurity certification authority, and not NCSC’s partners or the public.  
S Supportive role 
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#1 Facilitator of knowledge sharing 
Options a. Expansion in terms of topics b. Expansion in terms of partners 
Strengths • Information sharing about best practices and tools (: standards and certifications) 
within the mandate 
• On a voluntary basis broadening of collaborations within the mandate247 
• Making use of in-house knowledge and experience 
Opportunities • Helping current partners with useful information 
• Establishing new networks of collaborators 
• Creating a niche by connecting conformity assessment bodies with industry. 
Obstacles/Risks • Potential overlap for the European CSA certifications with the mandated role of the 
AT (: formal registry keeper) 
• Information needs to be accurate and up to date if published in a registry. 
Table 9: Overview of Role #1 key aspects 
Role 2: Awareness raising and training (supportive role) 
Background. The added value of cybersecurity certification is not always clear to the market. Certification 
bodies explain that the main driver for a company to be certified is an obligation imposed by law. This shows 
clearly that the benefits of trust, reliability, due diligence, accountability, and primarily the increase of security 
level in the certified product, process or service verified by an independent third party audit, are often overseen. 
Some consulted experts note that (cybersecurity) standards are slowly adopted and that the sector (energy) could 
benefit from faster adoption of new standards and certification schemes. Reasons for not adopting new standards 
are that the standards in themselves are relatively recent, the cost of implementing and subsequent certification 
are relatively high, and that cost/benefit ratio is unclear. NCSC can mitigate some of these factors by raising 
awareness and providing neutral information about the benefits of certain certifications for different sectors and 
thus contribute to the uptake of European cybersecurity certifications. 
Possible way to grow. In this role, the NCSC can educate companies established in the Netherlands about 
the impact of the European Cybersecurity certification schemes in each sector and how to navigate through the 
complex standards landscape. In addition, the different options offered by the CSA, monitored self-assessments 
and certification, should be explained.  
A starting point can be the critical infrastructure and vital sector companies, for which there are already 
established communication channels. Other companies could benefit from such activities. For such companies 
with an interest in cybersecurity certification and standardisation in other sectors, awareness raising could be 
done together with other governmental agencies such as the Digital Trust Centre. In this effort, the national 
standardisation body and the conformity assessment community can be requested to join in order to provide 
insights from practitioners, auditors, and experts in the field. 
Discussion. In this supportive/advisory role towards partners and other companies, the NCSC can make use 
of its network of partners to provide workshops and run awareness campaigns. A possible difficulty is identified 
in the lack of specific expertise in relation to the forthcoming CSA schemes and the relative dependence on 
certification bodies, which not only have extensive expertise in certification and cybersecurity, but also have a 
commercial interest in widespread adoption of certifications. This can be mitigated however by asking for specific 
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input from the CABs, while the NCSC maintains control of the workshops. The NCSC can make use of the 
opportunity the CSA offers with a significant change in the landscape, as identified by several interviewed 
stakeholders. Another positive aspect is fostering and strengthening the existing fora and collaborations, such as 
with the DTC and the Digital Trust Community.248 Role 2 is within the current mandate of the NCSC as regards 
the vital sectors, even though it should be carefully put forward to avoid any overlapping efforts from the national 
cybersecurity certification authority.  
S Supportive role 
#2 Awareness raising and training 
Strengths • Experience in providing workshops and awareness raising249  
• Within current legal mandate 
• Use of existing communication channels such as ISACs 
Opportunities • Help current partners 
• Expand network to new partners and conformity assessment bodies 
• Learn from information shared by conformity assessment experts 
Obstacles/Risks • To be viewed as promoting certification services (: maintaining control of the content of 
campaigns/trainings, and a neutral stance is necessary. Talk about both added value and risks) 
• Certification as such not a core business (: can be mitigated by collaborating with CABs). 
• Duplication of work, should other agencies in NL decide to do something similar (: 
coordination/collaboration is necessary) 
Table 10: Overview of Role #2 key aspects 
Role 3: Provide assistance to the national cybersecurity certification authority in its tasks 
(supportive/reactive role) 
Background. MinEZK will be the competent cybersecurity certification authority, which will delegate the 
task to the Radiocommunications Agency (AT). Although the AT has a long track record in oversight in the 
telecommunications market, cybersecurity certification is a relatively new unexplored area for the AT. Besides, 
CSA certification is also relevant to sectors and application areas in which the AT or other agencies, such as the 
AIVD, have little experience. The NCSC, due to its strong involvement in incident management, is in the unique 
position to get valuable information from the field that could also be relevant for certification as it can provide 
insight in areas or topics for which standards and best practices could be developed, or which deficiencies of a 
certification scheme exist. It can bring information to the table from all vital sectors (whereas the AT currently 
only has an overview of the energy and telecom sectors) and more partners. Moreover, the NCSC has a type of 
relationship with its partners which differs from the supervisory role the AT currently has for energy and 
telecom, and is expected to have with certification holders. The NCSC, as mentioned before, is perceived as a 
trusted partner available to assist its partners. Players in the field report that they can share sensitive information 
about incidents, threats, measures (not) taken with the NCSC without having to fear regulatory interventions or 
sanctions. 
The AT is expected to have both operational and supervisory roles. The operational role includes advising market 
players on cybersecurity certification. This requires an internal separation of units and people involved with the 
respective tasks within the AT. Yet, this may not be enough to give companies the confidence to exchange 
sensitive information with the AT (advisory branch). The market may still perceive an entanglement of 
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advisory/supervisory tasks. A possible way to mitigate this (perceived) conflict would be to designate NCSC as an 
information provider for cybersecurity certification while maintaining all supervisory roles at AT. 
Possible ways forward. The CSA places particular emphasis on safeguards for the quality and reliability of 
the certification process. One of those guarantees is monitoring of implementation issues of the schemes. The 
NCSC could adopt a monitoring support role for the AT obtaining relevant information from NCSC's partners 
and transforming this into information that enables the AT to act, without disclosing information that may put 
the sources in further risks. On the basis of monitoring developments on the floor, the NCSC can also detect other 
cybersecurity issues within the realm of AT oversight, and bring aggregated data to the attention of the AT 
without potentially affecting the relationship between AT and parties in the field.  
Another area where the NCSC can support the AT is by building up further expertise on technologies and their 
vulnerabilities in the operational domain, that can be consulted by the AT when necessary. This would potentially 
be more efficient than having each entity develop expertise on specific technologies. This would require making 
clear arrangements within the various entities involved in cybersecurity (AT, AIVD, MIVD, NCTV, etc.) where 
technical expertise resides (collaboration instead of pseudo competition).   
Moreover, the NCSC can support the AT in its tasks during the evaluation for high-assurance level certifications. 
Upon request by the AT, the NCSC may provide non-binding advice in specific cases with high-complexity. The 
NCSC has the expertise to provide such advice, because of its close collaboration with the vital sectors, which 
equip the NCSC with knowledge not met in other agencies, in such depth at least. The collaboration for a complex 
assessment could benefit from combined advice of actors such as the NCSC and the AIVD, depending on the 
scope of assessment. 
Furthermore, the NCSC could identify new areas and topics for European Cybersecurity certifications and 
communicate them to the AT, and in turn to the ECCG, which has the power to request ENISA to prepare 
candidate schemes. Such information on needs and trends for the development of new certifications would be 
gathered from NCSC’s partners. 
Last, Art. 57 CSA provides national certification schemes on topics covered by a European cybersecurity 
certification scheme cease to produce effects. However, with a few exceptions, certification schemes might have 
partially overlapping scope with the European ones. This practically means that some knowledgeable and reliable 
body needs to make such an assessment of the overlapping scopes and the conflicts between national and 
European schemes. This is not a task necessarily reserved for the national cybersecurity certification authority, 
and the NCSC could take on this supportive role in collaboration with the AT and conformity assessment experts. 
Discussion. The supportive and reactive roles towards the national cybersecurity certification authority are 
relevant to current activities for the Agency. The AT remains the national cybersecurity certification authority 
responsible for cyber security certification. The NCSC could facilitate the AT from its operational knowledge 
regarding cyber incidents and their mitigation as well as with the general cybersecurity knowledge present and 
being developed at the NCSC. Knowledge of standards, standardisation, conformity assessment and accreditation 
can help NCSC to provide relevant information to support AT’s roles. Another consideration is that the AIVD is 
put forward by some governmental interviewees as the go-to expert given their current expertise with high 
assurance security certification. It deserves further exploration whether indeed cybersecurity certification can do 
entirely without the help of the NCSC, and whether the knowledge of the AIVD on Common Criteria is 
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sufficiently addressing all the issues pertaining to vital sectors. It should also be noted that other interviewees 
urged for the Dutch regulator to use its full capacity as a whole and to avoid duplication of work and additional 
efforts building new capacity in some governmental agencies, which already exist in another.   
  




S/R Supportive/reactive role 
#3 Provide assistance to the national cybersecurity certification authority (AT) 























new areas and 
topics of 
certification based 
on NCSC’s partners 
and communication 
to AT. 
Gap and overlap 
analysis of national 
and CSA schemes 
Strengths • Deploying NCSC expert knowledge 
Opportunities • Help current partners by communicating their certification needs to the AT 
• Strengthen collaboration with AT 
• Complement advice of the AIVD on an as-needed basis 
• Avoid duplication of work of Dutch regulator at large 
Obstacles/ 
Risks 
• Compromise of trust relationship with partners if shared information is not aggregated and 
anonymised (: anonymisation of input is a necessary condition for this role) 
• Potentially little experience in gap and overlap analysis in certification 
Table 11: Overview of Role #3 key aspects 
Role 4: Provide knowledge and expertise during accreditation of certification bodies (reactive role) 
Background. The Cybersecurity Act obliges certification bodies and authorities to obtain accreditation for 
their CSA certification services. Accreditation will be conducted by the National Accreditation Body in line with 
the Regulation 765/2008. The RvA works with both internal and external resources for carrying out assessments. 
The RvA has in-house expertise allowing it to assess whether a conformity assessment body is competent to carry 
out a specific conformity assessment activity. In-house expertise is not necessarily present with regards to 
cybersecurity certification specific criteria. In areas that require a high level of expert knowledge, the RvA often 
collaborates with freelance experts who perform evaluations on its behalf. The decision on granting the 
accreditation is made by the RvA. NCSC is seen by many as having much in-house cybersecurity expertise. As 
such, it could play a role as a regular/preferred knowledge provider to the RvA. The added value for NCSC would 
be to further keep up with the state of the art regarding cybersecurity certification as a result of being involved 
in accreditation of CSA schemes, which in turn will facilitate NCSC in their information roles outlined above.  
Possible way forward. The NCSC could collaborate with the RvA on an as-needed basis by providing experts 
to assist the RvA in its accreditation assessments. This collaboration should not be confused with the supervisory 
activity of Art. 58(7)(c) CSA, which provides that the national cybersecurity certification authority has the power 
to “actively assist and support the national accreditation bodies in the monitoring and supervision of the activities 
of conformity assessment bodies”.  
The proposed role concerns assisting the RvA in conducting the assessments on whether a certification body 
fulfils the requirements, in particular those pertaining to cybersecurity expertise, to receive accreditation. Thus, 
this is a ‘reactive’ role, responding to requests of the RvA to the NCSC for lending its expertise, rather than a 
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proactive supervisory or monitoring role, that is reserved for the AT, as the competent certification authority. A 
similar practice is currently prescribed in the General Data Protection Regulation. Art. 43(2) of the GDPR 
provides three possible accreditation models of certification bodies, in which 1. the supervisory authority (Data 
protection Authority) provides accreditation, 2. The National Accreditation Body provides accreditation in line 
with ISO/IEC 17065/2012 and the additional data protection requirements established by the Data Protection 
Authority, or 3. By both the National Accreditation Body and the Data Protection Authority.250 The last model is 
a joint accreditation process, by both the NAB and the DPA, whereby the DPA complements the NAB in terms 
of data protection expertise. In the Netherlands, the RvA is the entity responsible entity for the accreditation, 
however the AP is also involved in the process.251 
Discussion. The role of lending expertise to the accreditation procedure conducted by the RvA builds on the 
accumulated knowledge of the NCSC in cybersecurity. However, the NCSC experts would potentially require 
additional training with regard to conformity assessment rules and procedures or need to be assisted by an 
experienced (in conformity assessment) RvA expert. This role does not fall within the current mandate of the 
NCSC, although, strictly speaking, it is not prohibited.  
Furthermore, this is a role that cannot be covered by the AT, which has a supervisory role in relation to 
accreditation. A possible difficulty could arise if public bodies in the Netherlands start offering services for high-
assurance level certifications in the future, as foreseen in the CSA.252 In that case, the NCSC would have to assess 
the cybersecurity level of a public authority. Nevertheless, the RvA would be the end decision maker in granting 
the accreditation, which is not less of a problem, since the RvA is an independent government agency, answering 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy.253 Another issue to be considered is the fact that this role 
could undermine or conflict with the supportive roles, either directly –due to requirements of independence of 
the evaluators– or indirectly, by impacting the trust collaborative relationship between the NCSC and its partners. 
A last consideration is a client relationship with CABs and a competitive relationship with other freelance 
assessors, which however can be avoided by establishing a framework of collaboration with the RvA, addressing 
such issues. Despite the above obstacles, the added value of such as role in contributing to proper assessments, is 
a plus for the reliability of the accredited certification bodies, and in turn certifications. 
R Reactive 
#4 Provide expertise during accreditation of certification bodies 
Strengths • Utilising existing expert knowledge in cybersecurity 
Opportunities • Growing in new fields and establishing new partnerships: Raad voor Accreditatie 
• Indirectly helping AT by providing reliable assessments (*could be particularly useful for 
CABs intending to offer services for high-assurance ICT products/processes/services) 
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Obstacles/Risks • Not clearly within current mandate 
• Might be conflicting with recommended advisory roles #1 and #2: acting as partner and 
participating in the CABs accreditation assessment. 
• Competitive relationship with other freelance assessors or consultancies (: can be avoided 
by taking on a specific type of assessments e.g. high assurance, and low/medium can be 
left for other assessors) 
• Client relationship with CABs (: can be avoided by establishing a general collaboration 
framework with the RvA, following the example of the GDPR/AVG accreditation model 
and the collaboration between AP and RvA). 
• Participation in such assessments not core business for NCSC, perhaps lacking experience 
(: joint assessments with RvA auditors experienced in conformity assessment – 
complementary knowledge) 
Table 12: Overview of Role #4 key aspects 
Role 5: Contribution to development of standards and certifications (reactive role) 
Background. Monitoring developments and sharing knowledge may contribute to taking a more active form 
than the previous proposed options. That is by actively contributing to the development of standards and 
certification schemes. Both in terms of standardisation and certification, the expertise of the NCSC-NL is valuable 
for national, European and international activities. Contributing to the drafting or offering expert advice and 
feedback, may increase the quality of standards and schemes, offer inside information to the NCSC about the 
developments, and strengthen its profile to a broader audience.  
Possible ways forward. 
A. Participate in a structured manner in standards development. As provided by the Dutch standardisation 
institute, NEN, standardisation committee members have a facilitating role, being the “ambassadors” of the Dutch 
stakeholders to the European and international committees. The NCSC already participates in the relevant 
Information Security, Cybersecurity and Privacy committee of NEN. The participation however could be done 
in a more systematic manner, with an agenda to  
1. identify new topics/elements for standardisation based on mapping the needs of NCSC’s partners and  
2. communicate those by contributing to the existing activities of CEN-CLC/JTC 13 “Cybersecurity and Data 
Protection” and ISO ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 “Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection.”  
The CEN-CLC/JTC 13 is specifically working on standards and other documents in support of the EU 
Cybersecurity Act, thus the NCSC could directly influence the standardisation developments in relation to the 
CSA.  
B. Participate in European cybersecurity certifications development. ENISA, in its task to prepare candidate 
certification schemes, is assisted by ad hoc groups. The NCSC could take on a role of participating in those groups, 
where a topic is of particular interest or potential impact for the Dutch stakeholders. An example of a candidate 
scheme with expected significant impact is the EU Common Criteria. In the ad hoc working group, there is a 
diversity of stakeholders participating, such as conformity assessment bodies (including a Dutch lab), security 
authorities, and industry representatives from critical sectors and others.254 This role is not preserved for the 
national competent authorities, such as the AT, which participates in the preparation of the schemes via the 
European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG), tasked to  
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provide advice and feedback throughout the preparation process. 
Discussion. The roles proposed in this section are building on the existing practice of the NCSC. They have a 
strong cross-border nature, as the NCSC is the vehicle to put forward the interests and needs of the Dutch 
stakeholders and influence developments, which will have an impact on the Dutch market. An eventual step 
before making the most of this role is an inventory of the skills and expertise currently present in the NCSC. It 
might be necessary for the NCSC to strengthen its knowledge in relation to certain topics, such as gaining more 
expertise in SCADA or other sector-specific systems. In this proposed role, there is no foreseen conflict with AT’s 
activities, but coordination might be useful to ensure a common front of Dutch stakeholder needs towards the 
European and international counterparts. 
R Reactive 
#5 Contribute to standards development and certification 
Options Structured participation in standards 
development 
Participation in ad hoc working groups of ENISA 
Strengths • Growing on an already established function (participation at NEN committees and ESOs, 
ISO/IEC committees via NEN) 
Opportunities • Expand network of collaborators and partners 
• Expand expertise in certification by participating in the making of candidate schemes and 
learning from ENISA and other participants 
• Be informed about the latest developments 
• Direct contribution to the developments 
• Help partners’ needs to be heard at the various standardisation and certification 
organisations/groups. 
Obstacles/Risks • Limited knowledge in relation to specific technologies 
• Lack of common line with AT (: no conflicting roles with AT, but coordination for a 
common Dutch policy front might be good to have) 
Table 13: Overview of Role #5 key aspects 
Role 6: Develop own scheme (proactive role) 
Background. While the development of CSA cybersecurity certification schemes is entrusted to ENISA, 
cybersecurity certification and seals may also be developed at national level, as long as they do not overlap with 
the European ones. In fact, several National Cybersecurity Agencies in other Member States (and the UK) are 
involved in certification at large or have their own standards and seals. The interviews and the research for the 
study revealed that such an approach would be appreciated by some of the stakeholders. Other stakeholders find 
no particular value or reason for such a role either speaking from a governmental point of view or from an 
industry perspective, since there are already several options available in the market. 
Possible ways forward. 
A. Develop NCSC “trusted party” scheme. Information sharing among stakeholders requires a level of trust. While 
there are already mechanisms in place to ensure that information is shared among trusted parties within ISACs 
(such as operating in “inner circles” or with Traffic Light Protocol), enlarging the collaboration and information 
platform would necessitate more advanced ways in building trust. A possible solution for the NCSC is to create 
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its own trusted party scheme to offer guarantees of expertise, confidentiality, and added value to the group of 
partners. A relevant option would be assurance of service providers in cybersecurity.  
• The NCSC-UK for example provides certification of professional NCSC Assured Service Providers. All the 
certified providers are included in a pool of expert consultancies, which meet the quality criteria of the NCSC-
UK.255 The NCSC-UK also provides other certifications: Cyber Essentials,256 Certified Assisted Products, Cyber 
Security Professionals, Certified Training and Certified Degrees, Penetration Testing, Commercial Product 
Assurance, Assured Services, and Cyber Incident Response.257   
• The NCSC-UK has been working with the so-called Fusion Cells, which are cyber-attack monitoring operations 
rooms, with participation of industry (cross-sector) and government. 
B. Develop own cybersecurity label. A proactive potential role for the NCSC is to develop its own cybersecurity 
label for products and systems. This could entail either the development of a homegrown ‘standard’ or building 
on a combination of existing standards. The NCSC-NL cybersecurity label would be voluntary, and the purpose 
would be to help its partners navigate through the jungle of standards, and to support the supply chain security, 
and international collaborations.  
• An example of such a scheme developed by another NCSC is the German Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik (BSI) certification which assesses the security statements/claims of vendors for products.258 
This meta-scheme is lighter than regular conformity assessment activities, and offers tangible benefits to the 
users of certified products.259  
The NCSC would not need to administer the scheme, as such a role can be played by other independent 
organisations with expertise in the field, such as NEN. 
Discussion. The options outlined in this section require moderate to substantial effort to materialise, in 
addition to a potential update of the mandate of the NCSC. Furthermore, as this is not NCSC’s core expertise it 
would need to obtain the expertise and resources, especially in the case of its own cybersecurity label, and ensure 
that it has a clear place in the market among the multitude of other certifications.  
In adopting such a role, the NCSC would also need to ensure that its statutory role stemming from the Wbni and 
the Bbni, would be separated from the certification services, to avoid conflicts of interest and compromise of 
independence. Despite these obstacles, this proactive role could bring added value to both the profile and capacity 
of the NCSC, its partners, and cybersecurity in general, since in the first option information sharing would be 
done among verified trusted parties, and in the second option, the NCSC label would guarantee quality assurance 
and rigorous assessment. Especially, in the case of a trusted party scheme, trusted groups could grow further than 
information sharing and analysis, in working together in teams doing tests similar to the threat intelligence-based 
ethical red teaming (TIBER), established in the banking sector.260 In addition, the NCSC-NL could exchange best 




#6 Develop own scheme 
Options Develop NCSC “trusted party” 
scheme 
Develop own cybersecurity label 
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Strengths • Utilising existing cybersecurity expertise  
• Addressing an existing target audience (partners and collaborators) 
Opportunities • Helping fostering trust among partners 
• Facilitating the growth of trusted partners (see Role #1) 
• Boost information and knowledge exchange among a larger group of entities 
• Strengthening relationships with other cybersecurity agencies with similar activity such as the 
UK and DE 
Obstacles/Risks • Outside the current mandate 
• Function creep in option nr. 2 (can be mitigated with functions/departments separation within 
the NCSC, see also ISO/IEC 17065) 
• Possibly limited knowledge in drafting schemes (could be assisted by CABs, or by participating 
in the ad hoc WG of ENISA, Role #5) 
• Lack of experience in operating schemes (independent entity such as NEN could take over this 
role) 
• Risk of client relationship if fees are charged (see risk mitigation measures in other agencies) 
Table 14: Overview of Role #6 key aspects 
Last but not least, several of the proposed roles position the NCSC as a knowledge centre with an established 
network of trusted partners within the vital and other sectors. Strengthening the capacity and profile of the NCSC 
in this area is useful for future developments in the field of cybersecurity. An example is the European 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and 
Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres, which recently received the 
green light from the Council for new negotiations with the European Parliament.261 The NCSC could take on the 
role of the National Coordination Centre, which according to the Commission proposal would need to 1. “possess 
or have direct access to technological expertise in cybersecurity” and 2. “be in a position to effectively engage and 








The aim of this Report was to examine whether and how the Dutch cybersecurity certification landscape has 
started to respond to the EU Cybersecurity Act and whether the needs of stakeholders point at the direction of 
NCSC in having a role in the evolving landscape (and which roles those would be). 
There are several developments to be expected in the forthcoming year. Especially at the legislative level, the 
Dutch law adapting the national legislation to the CSA, which is currently being drafted, is expected to be voted 
and adopted. The law will designate the Radiocommunications Agency (EZK) as the national cybersecurity 
certification authority in the Netherlands. Second, the first European cybersecurity certification schemes which 
are now being developed by ENISA will be adopted by the European Commission. Thus, the reaction of the 
market currently can only be measured on the basis of intentions and interest of the stakeholders. An indicator 
of interest in engaging with the new cybersecurity schemes is the intention to apply for accreditation and offer 
services based on those future schemes. 
Despite this evolving setting, there are several key findings from both the desktop research and the expert 
interviews. Those findings informed the section sketching the potential role of the NCSC in the cybersecurity 
certification landscape in the Netherlands, together with the assessment of NCSC’s current mandate and 
framework of operation. 
A first issue is the fragmentation of the regulatory landscape and the multitude of governmental agencies dealing 
with some aspect of cybersecurity, including standardisation and conformity assessment. A centralised approach 
has been put forward by interviewees, who find value having to deal with a single regulator. The complexity of 
the landscape often leads to confusion (who is the competent authority? Who has the right expertise for X issue? 
To which authority do I report a breach?) and obscurity, which brings along risks and in any case, does not foster 
a healthy relationship between regulator and regulated entities. Apart from the governmental actors, Public 
Private Partnerships are also many, often overlapping. While PPPs offer excellent opportunities for collaboration 
and information sharing among their participants, experts report that sometimes those are inactive and might not 
work as initially planned. Besides, regulatees spend considerable resources on all those different initiatives. 
Another issue is the lack of awareness regarding the added value of independent assessments and certification. 
While industry in the critical infrastructure is made aware of the importance of cybersecurity certification, 
including through the duty of care imposed by the Wbni, smaller organisations in other sectors, are not familiar 
with certification. Even in the critical infrastructure, organisations often opt for second party assessments instead 
of certifications, since smaller companies in the supply chain cannot afford certification. Moreover, unless 
certification becomes mandatory, certain stakeholders tend to maintain a hesitant stance due to its high costs as 
opposed to clear added value. This issue is related to the uneven distribution of cybersecurity costs in general, as 
identified in the Cybersecurity Assessment (2019), and the lack of incentives to re-adjust the cost-benefit ratio. 
The EU Cybersecurity Act is expected to stir the Dutch cybersecurity certification landscape. Much will depend 
on the scope of the European certifications, which will determine which sectors will be urged or possibly required 
by law to undertake a certification process. Many conformity assessment bodies, established in the Netherlands, 
plan to seize the new opportunity and get accredited in order to provide services for the new certifications. The 
success of the voluntary certifications is also expected to depend on the added value it brings to the certification 
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holder. Compliance with legal obligations, participation in procurements, enhancement of trust and reliability in 
business to business and business to consumer relationships are drivers that urge companies to pursue 
certifications. 
In general, the interviewed experts for this study consider the NCSC a respected agency, concentrating unique 
expertise in cybersecurity and playing an active role in emergency response, but also knowledge sharing. 
Nonetheless, the mandate of NCSC is not always clear, especially to non-partner organisations, such as conformity 
assessment bodies. In addition, it is clear that the Netherlands is and should continue being an active actor in the 
European arena, both in terms of standardisation and certification. 
In this landscape, the NCSC has several options to move forward, ranging from supportive, reactive to proactive 
roles. Facilitating knowledge sharing on cybersecurity certifications via national ISACs, or other informal 
collaborations, raising awareness and conducting trainings, expanding voluntary collaborations with certification 
bodies and other stakeholders are in general roles within the current mandate of the NCSC, with strong 
supportive character. NCSC could also explore the option of providing substantial assistance to the national 
cybersecurity certification authority in providing advice during the assessments of high assurance certifications, 
or providing aggregated data on deficiencies in the implementation of schemes. Alternatively, the NCSC could 
lend its expertise to the National Accreditation Body to conduct assessments of certification bodies. Further, 
continuing and systematising the current work of the NCSC in standardisation, could be valued by its partners, 
as promoting their interests at national, European, and international fora. Last, following the example of the 
National Cyber Security Centres of other countries, the NCSC-NL could develop its own national scheme and 
label, in areas not covered by the European cybersecurity certifications.  
 
Figure 6: Overview of potential new/extended roles for NCSC 
All those options, bring forward two main elements of the NCSC: the trusted partnerships and deep expert 
knowledge in the field. The study showed that there are issues to be considered when adopting some of those 
options such as maintaining the trust relationship with its partners, and expanding its legal mandate. On top of 
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other forthcoming related developments, which may strengthen its mandate, such as the ongoing revision of the 
NIS Directive. 
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     ANNEX 1: Accredited conformity assessment bodies in the Netherlands (cybersecurity) 
The following Table provides an overview of conformity assessment bodies accredited by the National 






Relevant standards Certification scheme 




ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2, -3, Common Criteria for 
Information Technology Security Evaluation 
(CC), and ISO/IEC 18045, Common Criteria 
Evaluation 
Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security 
[NSCIB] 
DEKRA Certification B.V. CB Management 
systems 
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 20000-1, NEN 7510 
Medical information technology – Information 
security in healthcare 
Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 27006, Certification of 
Information Technology Service Management Systems,  
Accreditation granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 20000-6, 
NTA 7515:2016 Conformity assessment - Requirements for 
bodies providing audits for certification of information security 
management systems in healthcare 
Kiwa Nederland B.V. CB Management 
systems 
ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IC 27006 
TÜV Nederland QA B.V. CB Management 
systems 
ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 27006 




ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 





ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 





ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 27006 
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Brightsight B.V. IT Security 
Evaluation Facility 
Lab Test lab Common Criteria v3.1 - NEN-ISO/IEC 15408-1, 
-2, -3 - Common Evaluation Methodology v3.1 - 
NEN-ISO/IEC 18045 For EAL1-EAL7, 
ALC_FLR.3, ASE_TSS.2 
 
Unknown (type of activity: evaluation of IT-security products 
Riscure B.V. Security Lab Lab Test lab Common Criteria v3.1 - NEN-ISO/IEC 15408-1, 
-2, -3 - Common Evaluation Methodology v3.1 - 
NEN-ISO/IEC 18045 For EAL1-EAL7, 
ALC_FLR.3, ASE_TSS.2 
Unknown (type of activity: evaluation of IT-security products 
TrustCB B.V.  Product 
certification 
ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2, -3, Common Criteria for 
Information Technology Security Evaluation 
(CC), and ISO/IEC 18045, Common Criteria 
Evaluation Methodology for Information 
Security Evaluation (CEM) 
 
MIFARE Security Certification Scheme - type certification 
(testing) 




ISO/IEC 27001, ISO 20000-1 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 27006, Certification of 
Information Technology Service Management Systems, 
Accreditation granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 20000-6 
 
Brand Compliance B.V. CB Management 
systems 
ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 






ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 27006 
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Digitrust B.V. CB Management 
systems 
ISO/IEC 27001, NEN 7510-1 Medical 
information technology – Information security 
in healthcare 
Information Security Management Systems Accreditation 
granted in accordance with ISO/IEC 27006, NCS 7510: 
Conformity assessment - Requirements for bodies providing 
audits for certification of information security management 
systems in healthcare for Cluster B: - Managers of personal 
health information, other than healthcare institutions, NCS 
7510: Conformity assessment - Requirements for bodies 
providing audits for certification of information security 
management systems in healthcare for Cluster Z: - Healthcare 
institutions 
 




NEN 7510-1 Medical information technology – 
Information security in healthcare 
NTA 7515 Conformity Assessment - Requirements for 
Institutions conducting Audits for perform certification of 
information security management systems in healthcare 
Accreditation is provided under NTA 7515 and addendum to 
NTA 7515 
 
ANNEX 2: Interviewed individuals and organisations 
          Expert Organisation 
          Government 
1. Warna Munzebrock, Coordinating senior 
advisor, Supervision Policy and Sanctions 
Department 
Agentschap Telecom 
2. Rob Huisman, expert Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties (Ministry of Interior and 
Kingdom Relations) 
3. anonymous Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat (EZK) 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate) 
4. anonymous Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat (EZK) 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate) 
5. anonymous NCSC 
6. anonymous NCSC 
7. Matthijs Balder, Senior Policy Officer NCTV 
          Conformity Assessment Bodies 
8. anonymous, Service Manager, cybersecurity 
expert 
DEKRA Certification B.V. 
9. Vincent Roes, Head of Strategic Development, 
Vice-President Service Division Product 
Testing 
DEKRA Certification B.V. 
10. anonymous TÜV Nederland 
11. Remco Kruit, Local Business Field Manager 
Systems 
TÜV Rheinland Nederland 
12. Frank Groenewegen, Chief Security Expert FOX IT 
13. anonymous FOX IT 
          Energy sector 
14. Machiel Bolhuis, Adviseur Regulatory Affairs 
- databeleid 
ENECO 
15. Justin Broeders, Manager Privacy and Security ENECO 
16. Anne Spoelstra, CISO ENECO 
17. anonymous, Group Information Security 
Officer  
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18. Donald Kreiken, European Energy Regulation 
Advisor 
TENNET 
19. Ron Wibbelink, Manager Team Corporate 
Security 
TENNET 
20. Johan de Wit, Technical Officer Enterprise 
Security 
SIEMENS Smart Infrastructure 
21. Ton Mes, Product & Solution Security Officer SIEMENS Smart Infrastructure 
          Banking sector 
22. Hans van Loon, Advisor Cybersecurity Dutch Bank Association (Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Banken (NVB)) 
23 Remco Ruiter, Liaison officer Dutch Payments Association (Betaalvereniging 
Nederland  
24. anonymous Rabobank 
          Standardisation organisation 
25. Tom Hoogendijk, Consultant ICT 
standardisation 
Dutch Standardisation Institute NEN 
26. Harmen Willemse, Programma Manager 
Schemabeheer 
Dutch Standardisation Institute NEN 
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ANNEX 3: Interview Guidelines  
 
Interview on cybersecurity certification in NL  
 
Background: 
This interview is part of the project of the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society on cybersecurity 
certification, commissioned by the NCTV/NCSC. The aim of the project is threefold: 1. Identify the 
drivers/trends/and needs of stakeholders in the Netherlands with regard to cybersecurity, and cybersecurity 
certification in specific. 2. To identify the impact of the Cybersecurity Act and the EU developments on 
cybersecurity certification. 3. And sketch the role of the NCSC in this landscape for example towards its regulatees 




A. General questions about the company 
 
• What is the nature (public/private) of your organization? 
• How many employees does your organisation have? 
• What is the core business/services that your organisation offers? 
• In which countries is your organisation operating? If more than one, are the headquarters in NL? 
• To what type of clients does your organisation offer services? Any specialization/focus on operators of 
essential services? Eg. Energy and banking sectors., SMEs? 
• What kind of activities is your organisation deploying in the field of cybersecurity? Why are you 
interested in cybersecurity? 
• Since when is your organisation active in the field of cybersecurity certification? 
 
B. Needs – Trends – Drivers of cybersecurity certification in NL (and EU) 
  
• Which cybersecurity or information security national/European/international standards do you certify? 
• Are those product/systems/services/persons standards? 
• Which are the most commonly adopted cybersecurity or information security standards in energy and 
the banking sector? 
• What are your views regarding the value/significance of cybersecurity certification? 
• What do you see as main challenges/obstacles when it comes down to obtaining, maintaining and using 
certificates? 
▪ Is cost an issue? What influences the costs of certification? Name some factors. 
• Which are the main drivers for a company in NL to obtain certification in cybersecurity in your view? 
 
 






• Which certifications in your view will be attractive for companies in the future and why?  
▪ Generic/sector specific? 
▪ In which topics/areas? 
▪ ICT products? systems? services? processes? persons/ skills? 
 
• What do you think of mandatory cybersecurity certification? (=imposed by a national or Union law)? Which 
are the benefits and drawbacks in your view?  
• Which are the main drivers for a company in NL to obtain certification in cybersecurity in your view? 
• Which certifications in your view will be attractive for companies in the future and why?  
▪ Generic/sector specific? 
▪ In which topics/areas? 
▪ ICT products? systems? services? processes? persons/ skills? 
• What do you think of mandatory cybersecurity certification? (=imposed by a national or Union law)? Which 
are the benefits and drawbacks in your view?  
• In several studies, impartiality and integrity is linked to trust in certification. In the website of your 
organisation, there is a dedicated page on integrity. Would you like to talk more about this? 
 
C. Impact of CSA and EU developments on cybersecurity certification 
• As regards regulatory developments in the field: what are the most important sources of information? 
• Do you feel adequately informed about the regulatory developments in the field of cyber security? 
• Are you familiar with (the main elements of ) the European Cyber security Act? 
• What will in your view be the impact of the European Cyber security Act: 1. Overall 2. The (energy) sector, 
and especially existing certifications in the energy sector? 
• Do you have a clear view on the impact the CSA will have for your company (threats, opportunities), especially 
the common European cybersecurity certifications? 
• What do you expect of the market uptake of cybersecurity certification, after the Cybersecurity Act? 
• Which sectors will be leading? 
• What do you see as main drivers for developing the market for cybersecurity certifications? (reputation, supply 
chain pressure, compliance, …..? 
• Do you see a value in Cybersecurity certifications being European (common across th EU) instead of national? 
Why or why not? 
• Do you plan to be accredited for the CSA sybersecurity schemes? Why? What is the added value on top of 
what you already provide in the field of cybersecurity? 
 





D. Role of NCSC, and Dutch regulator  
• Do you collaborate with the Dutch gov/regulators in cybersecurity (certification) issues? With which agencies? 
•  Are you aware of the NCSC, their role & powers? 
▪ Has your organisation ever contacted or cooperated with the NCSC? 
▪ How would you describe your evaluation of the role and value of the NSCS in the field? 
•  What do you miss when you evaluate the current role of the NCSC? In other words: which additional 
advisory/supportive roles/tasks could the NSCS in your view take on to stimulate the developments or improve 
the quality of current processes in the field? (providing more information, sharing more expertise, contribute 
more actively in the development of schemes,…….) 
• What role do you envisage from the Dutch regulator, and the NCSC in specific, in the future cybersecurity 
standardisation and certification landscape in NL?  
- in their regulatory capacity (making certificates mandatory?) 
- in their capacity as leading IT-customer (stimulating) 
- in their capacity as caretaker of the economy (stimulating, funding, research, education, ..) 
- as source for sharing knowledge 
- as source for disseminating information to the market 
- otherwise 
• What do you think of a national cybersecurity certification scheme developed or handled by the Dutch 
regulator? 
• Do you feel that the needs of the Dutch market in relation to cybersecurity are well represented in the Union? 
Where should the regulator put more emphasis? What should be corrected? 
• Do you have a view/preference on which (types of) government organizations should be involved specifically 
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